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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 20001049-SC

v.
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON CERTIORARI REVIEW

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
opinion affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's post-judgment motion for a
restitution hearing. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a)(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the court of appeals correctly determine that defendant's postjudgment motion was untimely where Utah's restitution statute
expressly requires a defendant to request a restitution hearing "at the
time of sentencing"?
This Court reviews statutory interpretations for correctness. State v. Burns, 2000

UT 56,f 15, 4 P.3d 795; State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 10, 992 P.2d 986.

II.

Did the court of appeals correctly decide that defendant's right to a
restitution hearing was not revived through a post-judgment motion on which
the trial court heard oral argument but refused to take evidence?
This Court reviews a court of appeals decision for correctness. State v. Visser,

2000 m 88, f 9,22 P.3d 1242.
IIL

Did the court of appeals correctly apply Robertson in holding that a trial court
need not make expressfindingson the factors relevant to determining
restitution under Utah's restitution statute?
Whether the court of appeals correctly applied Robertson is a question of law

reviewed for correctness. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is attached at Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in three different cases with one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R.
2830:3);1 two counts of receipt or transfer of a stolen motor vehicle, second degree
felonies (R. 3049:3; R. 3239:2-3); and one count of failure to respond to an officer's
signal to stop, a third degree felony (R. 3239:2-3). On July 6, 1999, pursuant to plea
negotiations, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted illegal possession or use
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 2830:19, 21-27); one count of

l

The State will cite to the records in these cases using the same convention applied
by defendant. See Pet. Br. at 3 n. 1.
2

attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony (R. 3049:24, 2632); and one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree
felony (R. 3239:22, 24-30).
On September 10, 1999, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms in these and
four other cases (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:5, 10; Final order
in defendant's case no. 991902297).2 The terms were ordered to run consecutively to
sentences imposed by Judge Noel on pleas to five additional unrelated third degree
felonies (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:5, 10; Final order in

2

Defendant was charged in case no. 991902297 with forgery, a third degree felony,
and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (PSI at 3). He
pleaded guilty to one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third
degree felony (PSI at 3).
Defendant was charged in case no. 91903420 with possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a class B
misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and driving on a
suspended license, a class C misdemeanor (PSI at 5). Defendant pleaded guilty to one
count of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony (PSI at 5).
Defendant was charged in case no. 991903821 with burglary, a second degree
felony; theft, a second degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony; and possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in connection
with a theft that occurred on or about December 1, 1998 (PSI at 2). Defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of attempted burglary, a third degree felony (PSI at 2).
Defendant was charged in case no. 991904978 with possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor; false identification to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor; and driving
on a suspended license, a class C misdemeanor (PSI at 4). Defendant pleaded guilty to
attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (PSI 4).

3

defendant's case no. 991902297). Based on information contained in his pre-sentence
investigation report ("PSI"), defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount
of $9,104.35 (R. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 2:10; Final order in
defendant's case no. 991902297). Defendant did not object to the trial court's restitution
order or request a restitution hearing at the time of sentencing. He also did not object to
any material information contained in his PSI upon which his sentences were based (R.
70:Tab 2).
Eleven days after the trial court entered its final judgments, defendant filed a
Motion for Review Hearing requesting a restitution hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 763-201(4)(e) (R. 2830:37, 3049:41; 3239:39). After hearing oral argument, but without an
evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion (R. 2830:40, 42; 3049:45;
3239:42, 43). Defendant timely appealed (R. 2830:44; 3049:47; 3239:45).
The court of appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's restitution
order. State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,12 P.3d 110 (Addendum B). Defendant's
petition for writ of certiorari was granted on February 27, 2001. State v. Weeks, 21 P.3d
218 (Utah 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On his latest crime spree, which occurred between December 1, 1998 and February
26, 1999, defendant was caught with methamphetamine and marijuana four times. He

4

also stole three cars, led officers on two high-speed chases through residential areas, and
forged at least one check.
Case No. 991903239. On December 16, 1998, Yolanda Garcia reported that her
1994 Ford Mustang had been stolen from a store parking lot while she shopped (R.
3239:3). Around 11:30 p.m. that same night, an officer activated his police lights after
observing the Mustang on the road (R. 3239:3). However, instead of stopping, the driver
of the Mustang accelerated to over seventy miles per hour through a residential area (R.
3239:3). After running through four different stop signs and making numerous turns, the
driver eventually stopped the car, got out, and ran away (R. 3239:3). A letter addressed to
defendant and defendant's finger prints were found inside the Mustang (R. 3239:3-4).
Defendant was charged with receiving a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree
felony, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (R.
3239:2-3). The State dismissed the stolen motor vehicle charge in exchange for
defendant's guilty plea to failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop (R. 3239:22, 2430).
Case No. 991903049. On December 19, 1998, three days after the Mustang theft,
David Hatton reported that his 1992 Honda Accord had been stolen from his driveway,
where it had been parked, uninsured and unregistered (R. 3049:4). Because another car
had been parked behind Mr. Hatton's Accord, whoever stole it had to first push the other
car out of the way (R. 3049:4). A few weeks later, Leisa Watkins reported that she had

5

noticed a Honda Accord being parked in front of her mailbox several times, and that the
driver, whom she identified as defendant, would park the car and walk to a residence
located down the street (R. 3049:4). After recovering the Accord, Mr. Hatton discovered
that the car's steering column had been broken (R. 3049:4). A screwdriver had been used
to start the car (R. 3049:4).
Defendant was charged with one count of receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle, a second degree felony (R. 3049:3). He was subsequently allowed to plead guilty
to a reduced charge of attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle, a third degree
felony (R. 3049:24, 26-32).
Case No. 991902830. On January 23, 1999, the vehicle defendant was driving
was stopped on a registration violation (R. 2830:4). After impounding the vehicle, police
found a container of methamphetamine (R. 2830:4).
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony (R. 2830:3-4). He was subsequently allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of
attempted possession, a class A misdemeanor (R. 2840:19, 21-27).
Sentencing. Defendant's sentencing hearing on these three cases and four others,
see footnote 2 supra, was held on September 10, 1999 (R. 70:Tab 2). At that time,
defendant stated that "[t]here are just two mistakes in the presentence report I wanted to
point out. I guess they're not mistakes, they're just corrections. On page 10 and then on
the last page when it's reflecting the amount of time he served" (R. 70:Tab 2:3).

6

Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of any other information contained in his
presentence investigation report (PSI) at the time of sentencing (R. 70:Tab 2).
Defendant's PSI indicated the following: that defendant had an extensive criminal
history dating back to his early teens, including numerous tobacco, alcohol, and drug
violations, as well as theft, burglary, forgery, and destruction of property (PSI Addendum
at 9-12); that Mr. Hatton, the victim in case no. 991903049, estimated the cost of repairs
to his Honda Accord and of replacing several missing items to be $1,500 (PSI at 8); that
Ms. Garcia, the victim in case number 991903239, reported a loss of personal items
valued at $500, payment of a $500 deductible on her Mustang's insurance policy, and
payment of an additional $500 "for repair and a complete repainting of her car to make it
all match" (PSI at 9); that Ms. Garcia's insurance company had paid $6,104.35 toward her
vehicle's repair (PSI at 9); and that defendant was a healthy twenty-year-old who had
been gainfully employed in the past (PSI at 13; PSI Addendum at 14, 16).
The PSI recommended that defendant be committed to prison "and that he be
required to pay a $625 fine, $532 surcharge, full restitution and $200 recoupment fee
upon parole" (PSI at 14).
Just before defendant was sentenced, the State reiterated that defendant's criminal
history dated back to age fourteen, and that, besides abusing drugs and alcohol, defendant
is "a forger and he's a burglar[], he's a car thief and it's a miracle he didn't kill somebody
during the felony of evading" (R. 70:Tab 2:9).

7

Immediately following the State's comments, the trial court, although not
specifically addressing its reasons for ordering restitution, noted: "There's no mystery
about the fact that I'm going to obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where
you need to be, at least until you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you
were 14 to develop this style of living, it's going to take you a while [to] undevelop [sic]
it" (R. 70:Tab 2:9). The court then sentenced defendant to prison and jail terms and to
pay $9,104.35 in restitution (the total of the amounts reported by Mr. Hatton and Ms.
Garcia) and a $250 recoupment fee to his attorney (R. 70:Tab 2:9-10). Despite the PSI's
recommendation, the trial court did not order defendant to pay a fine or a surcharge.
Defendant did not object to the court's order or request a restitution hearing (R.
70:Tab 2). Final orders of his convictions and sentences were entered the same day (R.
2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38).
Motion for Review Hearing. Eleven days later, on September 21, 1999,
defendant filed a Motion for Review Hearing, requesting a restitution hearing pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) "on the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of
restitution claimed by the State" (R. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39). For the first time,
defendant challenged the factual basis for restitution and requested an evidentiary hearing
on that issue (R. 60).
The trial court heard argument on defendant's motion on October 18, 1999, but
took no evidence (R. 60). The trial court then clarified that the amount of restitution

8

ordered was the sum of the amounts identified in defendant's pre-sentence investigation
report and ruled:
Given the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I believe, by
preponderance of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that
the sums sought for restitution are fair and reasonable.
Given what I have reviewed, that being the presentence
report, as well as the orders in the matter, as well as now
having heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and [am]
now persuaded that preponderance of the evidence burden has
been met, that the numbers I have ordered as restitution is fair
and reasonable. Consequently the motion to modify the — I
will characterize it as a motion to modify the order of
restitution is denied.
(R. 60:4-5, 7; 2830:40, 42; 3049:44-45; 3239:42, 43). A final order was entered on
October 18, 1999 (R. 3239:43-44). Defendant timely appealed (R. 2830:44; 3049:47;
3239:45).
The court of appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's restitution
order. State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 12 P.3d 110.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I: Utah's restitution statute provides that if a defendant objects to a trial
court's restitution order, the trial court must provide him or her with a full restitution
hearing at the time of sentencing. The court of appeals correctly held that, under the
statute's plain language, a defendant must object to the restitution order at least when it is
made to preserve his right to a full restitution hearing. Defendant's suggested
construction—that the statute allows a defendant to request a hearing so long as he or she
9

does so "within a reasonable time" after a restitution order is entered—is both
unsupported by the statute's plain language and impractical in application.
Issue II. The court of appeals correctly held that the trial court's ruling on
defendant's post-judgment motion did not revive his right to a full restitution hearing,
where the trial court merely heard argument on the motion, without taking any evidence.
Issue III. The court of appeals properly applied Robertson in determining that the
trial court had considered defendant's financial condition prior to ordering restitution
where defendant's PSI contained information concerning his ability to be gainfully
employed, the trial court referred to defendant's PSI at sentencing, and the trial court did
not impose a fine even though the PSI recommended one.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT, UNDER
UTAH'S RESTITUTION STATUTE, A DEFENDANT MUST
OBJECT TO A RESTITUTION ORDER AT THE TIME OF
SENTENCING TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO A FULL
RESTITUTION HEARING.
Defendant asserts that the court of appeals' interpretation of Utah's restitution

statute—that, to preserve his right to a full restitution hearing, a defendant must object to
restitution at the time it is ordered—is erroneous. Pet. Br. at 23. Defendant's claim fails
where defendant concedes the court of appeals' interpretation is consistent with the
statute's plain language and where defendant's construction is unworkable.

10

A,

The plain language of section 76-3-201 supports the court
of appeals9 interpretation.

This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795; Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (noting "the best indication of legislative
intent is the statute's plain language"). Thus, when faced with a question of statutory
construction, this Court looks first to the statute's plain language. State v. Redd, 1999 UT
108, f 11,992 P.2d 986; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). The Court "need
look beyond the plain language only if [it] find[s] some ambiguity." Burns, 2000 UT 56,
atf 25.
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) of the Utah Code provides: "If the defendant objects to the
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e) (1999). Interpreting this provision, the court of appeals held that "the statute is
clear—any request for a foil restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing."
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 9.
The court's interpretation is consistent both with the statute's plain language and
with the inferences drawn from prior case law. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,
1029 (Utah 1996) (holding that defendant had no right to request restitution hearing on
appeal where he failed to request a hearing or otherwise object to the restitution order at
11

the time he was sentenced); State v. Snyder, 141 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) (same); State
v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that trial court erred in failing to
hold hearing where defendant "requested a restitution hearing at his sentencing").
In fact, defendant concedes that "strict adherence" to the statutory language
comports with the court of appeals' construction. See Pet. Br. at 24-26.3 However, he
then presents a nonsensical list of horrors as to why this construction cannot be
correct—all based on the unsupported and unsupportable assumption that a trial court is
without power to continue a sentencing hearing until a restitution hearing can be
scheduled. Cf Pet. Br. at 25 (arguing "strict adherence would require parties to subpoena
witnesses, collect evidence, and prepare arguments on short notice (court and parties are
notified of recommended restitution three days before sentencing (§ 77-18-l(6)(a)), on
the possibility that defendant may object to restitution at sentencing"); Pet. Br. at 25
(arguing "[s]trict adherence either would require the trial court to accommodate an
evidentiary hearing on a crowded calendar without advanced notice (an objection to
restitution imposed at sentencing would require a full hearing at that time); or it would

3

Although he first asserts that the court's holding is erroneous because the phrase,
"at the time of sentencing," refers to the trial court's duty, not defendant's, Aplt. Br. at 24,
defendant does not develop this argument. More importantly, he never explains how a
trial court can fulfill its statutory obligation to hold a restitution hearing at the time of
sentencing if the defendant does not request one until after the sentencing hearing has
ended. Cf State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12, 992 P.2d 986 (holding court "intepret[s] a
statute to avoid absurd consequences"); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1292
n.24 (Utah 1993).
12

require trial courts to anticipate a full hearing at every sentencing on the possibility that
restitution may be imposed and defendant may object"); Pet. Br. at 25 (arguing "strict
adherence would fail to accommodate due process" because "[t]he immediacy of the
matter (three days from the date parties are notified of the recommended amounts to
sentencing ...), would not accommodate the exchange, let alone the review, of
evidentiary materials or documents prior to the hearing, and it would not permit either the
state or defense to consider, let alone prepare, examinations or arguments to defend or
dispute the amount in restitution ordered at sentencing").
As the Weeks dissent even seems to concede, nothing prevents a trial court from
continuing a sentencing hearing once a defendant requests a restitution hearing. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201; Weeks, 2000 UT App. 273, at f 22 n.l. Indeed, it appears that
restitution hearings are scheduled subsequent to original sentencing dates as a matter of
course. See e.g., State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 339, 339-40 (Utah 1985); State v. Haga,
954 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah
App. 1997); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Starnes, 841
P.2d 712, 713-14 (Utah App. 1992).
Thus, none of the hardships posited by defendant or the due process concerns he
claims they raise are real. See Pet. Br. at 26. In sentencing, due process "require[s] that a
defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the
factual information upon which his sentence is based." State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853,

13

855 (Utah 1994). Here, the court of appeals' interpretation of section 77-3-201(4)
provides defendant with that right; the only requirement is that he exercise it at same
hearing in which the trial court imposes restitution. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 9.
Due process requires nothing more. Cf. Gomez, 887 P.2d at 855 (holding due process not
violated where defendant failed "to avail himself of the opportunity" to exercise rights
when originally given).
Because none of defendant's arguments support his claim that the court of appeals'
"strict adherence" to the language of section 77-3-201 was in error, defendant's claim
fails.4
B.

Nothing in section 76-3-201(4) reveals a legislative intent
to override the general rule in criminal cases that a
defendant waives any claims not timely raised.

As noted above, defendant asserts that section 76-3-201(4) should be interpreted to
require that a trial court provide a defendant with a full restitution hearing—even if he did

defendant's challenge to the court of appeals' statement that a defendant may also
request a restitution hearing before sentencing, see Pet. Br. at 24, is frivolous and, except
in this footnote, will not be addressed further. Most obviously, nothing in the court of
appeals' decision requires defendant to request a hearing prior to sentencing. Moreover,
one can easily imagine cases in which a defendant will nonetheless be prepared to do so.
Section 76-3-201(4) requires a trial court to order restitution under certain circumstances.
If a defendant's criminal conduct fits those circumstances, he or she can anticipate that
restitution will be an issue at sentencing. The defendant can then consult with the State
concerning the evidence upon which restitution will be requested and review his
presentence investigation report for any relevant information provided there. After
reviewing this evidence, some defendants may well be prepared to request a restitution
hearing prior to actual sentencing.
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not request one at the time the initial restitution order was entered—so long as he requests
one within "a reasonable time" after the restitution order was made. Pet. Br. at 28.
However, defendant fails to explain how the language of section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) supports
his interpretation.
The general rule in criminal cases is that a defendant waives all claims which he
does not timely raise. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993)
(holding claim not raised below "is not properly preserved for appeal"); State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988). Except in cases involving the legality of a sentence
under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this rule applies to sentencing issues
just as it does to any others. See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (holding
that defendant waived alleged sentencing errors where he "failed to make specific
objections to any of these alleged defects at the sentencing"); State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d
798, 801 (Utah 1990) (holding that defendant's failure to object to imposition of sentence
when it was imposed "constitutes waiver"); Snyder, 1A1 P.2d at 421 (holding that
defendant's failure to object to restitution order or to request restitution hearing "waived
the right he had to challenge the order of restitution").
Nothing in the language of section 76-3-201 evinces a legislative intent to exclude
restitution objections from this well-established rule. See Berube, 111 P.2d at 1038
(noting "best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language"). Thus,
defendant's construction should be rejected.
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C.

Defendant's interpretation would interject unwarranted
uncertainty and delay into the criminal process.

As stated above, defendant asserts that, under section 76-3-201, a trial court must
provide him with a full restitution hearing if, despite failing to object at the time
restitution is ordered, defendant raises an objection "within a reasonable time" after
restitution is ordered. See Pet. Br. at 28.
However, neither defendant nor the Weeks dissent defines what constitutes a
"reasonable time." See Pet. Br. at 28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Kf 21-23. Cf State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 1998) (holding that prosecution commencing 28 days
outside of 120 days required under detainer statute is "a reasonable time" where need to
accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" for delay); Renn v.
Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995) (noting that although relevant
petitions "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of,"
"reasonable time" requirement imposes "no fixed limitation period"); State v. Tyree, 2000
UT App 350, ^ 15, 17 P.3d 587 (holding that sentencing hearing held over 30 days
outside of statutory limit was "reasonable time" where delay was to accommodate
defendant), cert, denied, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1045
(Utah App. 1994) (noting case in which "seven weeks was reasonable time").
Nor does either address the factors relevant to that determination. See Pet. Br. at
28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Hf 21-23. Cf Monson v. State, 953 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah
1998) (identifying "good cause" in post-conviction petition context to include "new facts
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not previously known," "the existence of fundamental unfairness," and "a claim
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ"); State v. Peterson, 810
P.2d 421, 426-27 (Utah 1991) (identifying "good cause" for delaying criminal trial to
include "allowing] time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their differences,"
"unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial," and illness of defense counsel);
State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah App. 1991) (identifying "good cause" for delaying
criminal trial to include motions filed by defendant, "illness of the trial judge," and
"temporary unavailability of a witness").5
Moreover, neither addresses how such a post-judgment hearing would impact the
appellate process. See Pet. Br. at 28; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at Hf 21-23. Rule 4(a),
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that a defendant file a notice of appeal
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R.
App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(b) provides that the only exception to this requirement in criminal

5

Even if it were possible to extract from the language of section 76-3-20 l(4)(e)
what constitutes "a reasonable time" and the factors relevant thereto, it is unlikely that
defendant's filing here would meet those requirements. As the court of appeals stated:
It is clear from the record that defendant closely read the presentence report
which contained the recommended restitution amount, which is the exact
amount that the judge adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the recommended restitution
amount. Nothing in the record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the court imposed the
amount. Thus, [defendant] .. had no good cause not to make the request
[at that time].
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10.
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cases is the filing of "a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure .. .
under Rule 24 for a new trial." Utah R. App. P. (4)(b). There is no provision in rule 4 for
extending the time requirement to accommodate post-judgment motions for restitution
hearings. Utah R. App. P. (4).
Thus, under the current rules, unless a post-judgment motion for a restitution
hearing is filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment and thus could possibly be treated
as a motion for new trial (which a trial court then has discretion to deny, see State v.
Evans, 2001 UT 22,f26, 20 P.3d 888), such motion must, similar to motions to correct
an illegal sentence filed under rule of criminal procedure 22(e), be treated as commencing
a separate proceeding from that leading to defendant's underlying conviction and
sentence. Under such circumstances, defendant would be required to file a notice of
appeal within thirty days of the trial court'sfinaljudgment of conviction to preserve his
right to challenge his conviction and other sentencing issues; and then file a separate
notice of appeal if he wishes to challenge the trial court's ruling on his post-judgment
restitution hearing—which, depending on the definition of "reasonable time," may not be
issued until several months after the trial court'sfinaljudgment. See Utah R. App. P.
4(a), (b).
Section 76-3-201 neither requires nor supports such a convoluted process. As
interpreted by the court of appeals, section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), consistent with due process,
provides defendants ample opportunity to challenge a trial court's restitution order prior
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to the court's entering a final judgment. Consistent with the plain language of the statute,
the court's construction does not require definition of an amorphous phrase, "reasonable
time," that does not even appear in the statute; or interject independent appeals into the
appellate process on issues that can easily be addressed within the initial criminal
proceeding. Cf. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, K 12, 992 P.3d 986 (holding court
"intepret[s] a statute to avoid absurd consequences"); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846
P.2d 1282, 1292 n.24 (Utah 1993).
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), is
misplaced. Helm did not address the propriety of re-opening a criminal case after a final
judgment has been entered. Rather, it addressed the propriety of delays in criminal
proceedings that are still in progress. Specifically, Helm held that the statutory time
period within which a trial court should sentence a defendant is not mandatory and
jurisdictional, but is directory. As the Court explained, "[i]t requires no exposition
thereon to demonstrate what egregious injustices might result because of some
inadvertence, error or omission if [a defendant could go free because of the trial court's
inability to act within the statutory time frame], especially so in cases where serious
crimes may have been committed." Id. at 797. Because the legislature could not have
intended such an absurd result, this Court held that "where the sentence is imposed within
a reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's powers nor adverse effects upon
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the defendant," the trial court's delay in sentencing should not be grounds for his release.
Id.
Here, strict adherence to the language of section 76-3-201 does not lead to an
absurd result. The statute merely requires that, if a defendant wants the opportunity to
challenge a restitution order at a full restitution hearing, he must request such a hearing at
the time the restitution order is made. Defendant's ability to conform to that requirement
is completely and solely within his control. Thus, Helm does not apply. Cf. State v.
Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, f 20, 17 P.3d 587 (holding that Helm analysis does not apply to
time limits placed on individual parties because a party's ability to conform to those limits
"[is] within [the party's] own exclusive control"), cert, denied, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001).
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE EVIDENCE ON DEFENDANT'S
POST-JUDGMENT MOTION DID NOT REVIVE HIS RIGHT TO A
FULL RESTITUTION HEARING.
Defendant here "did not object, question, or even mention restitution at [the time

of] sentencing." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10. However, before the court of
appeals, defendant claimed that he revived his right to a full restitution hearing by
requesting one eleven days after the trial court had issued its final judgment. The court of
appeals rejected defendant's argument because "c[t]he trial court did not take evidence or
hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter or
Amend,' and, thereby, did not waive defendant's earlier waiver of the hearing." Id. at
20

1f 12 (citation omitted). Defendant now claims that the court of appeals' ruling is contrary
to State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992), State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150
(Utah 1991), and State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991).
A.

The court of appeals9 decision does not conflict with
Starnes.

In State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992), defendant was not present at
the hearing in which the trial court awarded restitution. After learning that defendant had
received no notice of the hearing, the trial court granted defendant's late request for a
restitution hearing. Starnes, 841 P.2d at 713. However, at none of the three subsequent
restitution hearings did the trial court allow defendant to present any evidence. Id. at 714.
The court of appeals held that, where a restitution hearing is requested by a defendant and
granted by a trial court, the defendant "is statutorily entitled to a 'full hearing' on the
question of restitution." Id. at 715. The court of appeals then concluded that defendant
did not receive a "full hearing" because he was not allowed to present any evidence. Id.
at 715-16.
Unlike in Starnes, defendant here was present when restitution was ordered and
could have requested a restitution hearing or otherwise challenged the trial court's
restitution order at that time (R. 70:Tab 2). He did not do so. Under these circumstances,
the trial court was not obligated to provide defendant with a "full" restitution hearing
when he filed his post-judgment motion. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e); Point I,
supra, at pp. 10-20.
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Moreover, Starnes does not apply here because the court of appeals specifically
concluded that the trial court's hearing on defendant's post-judgment motion was not a
restitution hearing, but rather a hearing to consider, within the trial court's discretion, the
legal basis for defendant's request for such a hearing. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at ^ 12.
The court of appeals' conclusion is consistent with the trial court's reference in its postjudgment ruling to the evidence before it at "the time of the sentencing" and with that
court's characterization of defendant's motion as "a motion to modify the order of
restitution" (R. 60:7).
Thus, the court of appeals' decision does not conflict with Starnes.
B.

The court of appeals9 decision also does not conflict with
Johnson or Matsamas.

In State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), the defendant claimed that the
State had failed to make the prima facie showing of corpus delicti necessary to admit her
incriminating statements at trial. Id. at 1160. Thus, that defendant presented a legal
issue determinable without taking any additional evidence. Although the defendant had
not raised this issue at trial, she raised it in a motion for new trial, and the trial court
addressed the legal question on the merits. Id. at 1161. This Court held that, by ruling on
the merits of the issue, the trial court revived the corpus delicti issue for purposes of
appeal. Id.
In State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991), the defendant claimed during
trial that the trial court improperly admitted evidence without making the findings
22

mandated by the applicable statute. Although that defendant had not raised the issue
before the trial court within the time frame set forth in the rules of criminal procedure,
this Court held that the trial court revived defendant's claim by hearing argument on and
then addressing the admissibility of the challenged evidence under the statute defendant
had identified. Id. at 1052-53.
Based on these cases, defendant claims that the trial court's willingness to hear
argument on whether to consider defendant's post-judgment motion and its failure to
mention the magic word "waiver" in denying the motion necessarily equate to the trial
court's reaching the motion's underlying merits. Certainly, this cannot be true. Under
such a rule, any time a trial court considers argument supporting a belated
claim—whether on the legal memoranda submitted or, as here, after supplemental
argument—such consideration, even if the trial court finds defendant's argument
unpersuasive, would be sufficient to revive the claim merely because the trial court does
not use the word "waiver." Neither Johnson or Matsamas support such a result that
serves only to frustrate Utah's preservation and waiver rules.
Here, the trial court set defendant's post-judgment motion for oral argument.
However, it never took evidence, even though an evidentiary hearing would have been
necessary to address the merits of defendant's restitution claim. Rather, the court heard
argument from defendant as to why a restitution hearing should be granted and then
rejected defendant's argument, and "merely clarified that the restitution amount ordered
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was based on the presentence report." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273 at ^12. Because the
trial court did not take evidence on defendant's motion, the court of appeals properly
concluded that the trial court "did not address the issue on the merits," and thus did not
revive defendant's right to a full restitution hearing. Id.', see also In re Estate of
Covington, 888 P.2d 675, 678-79 & n.6 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that merely raising
issue in post-trial motion does not preserve issue for appeal, and reading cases such as
Johnson and Matsamas to be limited to when trial court "had the opportunity and chose to
take evidence and fully hear the arguments raised").
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CONDITION BEFORE
ORDERING RESTITUTION IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S
RESTITUTION STATUTE AND ROBERTSON.
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erroneously upheld the trial court's

restitution order under State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) (Addendum C),
because "[t]he trial court must be held to specifically noting on the record its
consideration of the statutory factors in ordering restitution." Pet. Br. at 35. However,
the court of appeals correctly applied Robertson by (1) first determining that the trial
court had placed its reasons for ordering restitution on the record; and (2) then looking to
the record as a whole to ensure that the trial court had considered the relevant statutory
factors.
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Section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i) provides that "[i]f the [trial] court determines that
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the
reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)
(1999). Subsection (8)(c) then provides that, in determining what amount of restitution is
appropriate, "the court shall consider . . . the financial resources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the
defendant." Id. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c).
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by failing to
make specific findings concerning the factors listed in subsection (8)(c). The court of
appeals rejected defendant's claim, holding that "Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b)
(1999) does not require findings on the record concerning each of the factors." Weeks,
2000 UT App 273, at f 16. The court then applied Robertson to conclude that
"'[although the court did not makefindingsrelating to [defendant's] financial condition
part of the record, we can reasonably assume that the court actually made such findings.'"
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at H 17 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1235).
Because Robertson addressed two different restitution orders imposed under two
different restitution statutes, its discussion concerning a trial court's specific duty under
section 76-3-201 may not always be clear. If, as defendant asserts, Robertson requires the
trial court to make specific findings concerning the statutory factors that must be
considered under section 76-3-201(8) (c), the court of appeals erred infindingno error
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here. However, Robertson does not impose such a requirement on the trial court,
especially when read in the context of this Court's opinions addressing similar sentencing
statutes.
In Robertson, this Court held that section 76-3-201(4), the general restitution
statute, (1) requires that the reasons for ordering restitution be stated in the record, and
(2) identifies specific financial factors which the trial court must consider before ordering
restitution. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. In contrast, section 77-32a-3, which addresses
restitution of medical costs for competency tests, requires that the reasons be on the
record but only generally describes the financial factors which the trial court must
consider. Id.
Based on these provisions, the Robertson court remanded the trial court's section
76-3-201 restitution order because "the court did not discuss on the record the reasons."
Id. However, because the trial court had discussed its reasons for ordering section 7732a-3 restitution, this Court looked to the record as a whole to determine whether the
trial court had considered defendant's financial condition before ordering that form of
restitution. Id. at 1234-35.
In arguing that the court of appeals' decision here conflicts with Robertson,
defendant focuses on a statement that section 76-3-201(4) requires the trial court to
"'explicitly not[e] on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the
detailed factors in the statute'" Pet. Br. at 33 (emphasis added); Robertson, 932 P.2d at
26

1234. However, the emphasized portion of the Court's statement is dicta. Remand was
necessary under section 76-3-201 because the trial court had failed to place its reasons for
ordering restitution on the record, as required by section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i). Id. The
Court's comment on the factors, then, was unessential to its holding. Moreover, strict
application of the dicta is inconsistent with this Court's interpretation of a similar
statute—section 76-3-401(4), providing that "[a] court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences," Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-401(4)—which this Court has never interpreted as requiring specific findings on the
record. Cf. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,
244-45 (Utah 1995); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993); State v. Strung 846
P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993); State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Lee, 656
P.2d 443, 443-44 (Utah 1982) (per curiam).
In this case, the court of appeals found that the trial court had "stated on the record
that restitution was appropriate based on defendant's criminal acts and his criminal
history," Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 16. Because the trial court, as required by
section 76-3-20l(4)(c), put its reasons for ordering restitution on the record, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court had fulfilled the general restitution requirement
stated in Robertson. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at % 16.
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The court of appeals then turned to the part of Robertson addressing restitution
under section 77-22a-3 to determine whether the record as a whole supported the
conclusion that the trial court had considered defendant's financial condition in ordering
restitution here. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at U 17; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234 (noting
general rule that "this court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings").
Here, defendant's PSI addressed both the amount of restitution owed and
defendant's financial condition. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 17. Moreover, the trial
court specifically referenced the PSI at sentencing. Id. Finally, the trial court declined to
impose any fines on defendant even though the PSI requested them. Id. As in Robertson,
the court of appeals determined on these facts that the trial court had considered
defendant's financial circumstances in formulating its restitution order. Id. at f 17 (citing
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234-35).
The court of appeals' conclusion is a reasonable interpretation of Robertson and
section 76-3-20l(8)(c). Thus, defendant's final claim also fails.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the State asks this Court to affirm the court of appeal's
opinion.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities'' means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
*
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorne/s fees.
%
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution* constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
t
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
id) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of prdperty of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch.
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19;
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995,
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch.
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2,3; 1998, ch. 149,
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch. Ill, effective May 1, 1995, added
a
or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement" and made a related change in Subsection (4)(aKi).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection
(l)(d), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection i2), and added
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added uand as further defined in
Subsection (4XO" at the end of Subsection
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution;
added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redesignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc),
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996* for
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2)(g), which read: "on or after April 29,1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for life for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-

section <2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification o r and in Subsection
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3,
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections
(4)(aXvii) and (4)(dXiv).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998,
in Subsection (4)(a)(i) substituted "Subsection
llXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and
family member has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the
style of the internal references in Subsections
(5)(cXi), (5)(c)(ii), and (8)(c).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
in Subsection (6Xe). substituted "aggravating
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission"
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301,
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this section, as* amended by ch. 301, as Subsection
(4XaXvf).<
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995;
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amendment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29,
1996.
Cross-References. — Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et
seq.
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq.
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq.
Restitution as condition of probation, § 7718-1.
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule
22, R.Crim.P.
Special release from city or county jail, purposes, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

C onstitutionality.
Aggravating factors.
— Bodily injury to victim.
—Severity of offense.
—Sufficient.

Arrest record.
—Effect on sentence.
Credit for pretrial detention.
Discretion of court.
Effect of noncompliance.
Informal procedure.
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Court of Appeals of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Lance Michael WEEKS, Defendant and Appellant.

[3] Constitutional Law <@=>257
92k257
[3] Constitutional Law <@=>270(2)
92k270(2)

No 990979-CA
Oct. 5, 2000
Defendant pled guilty to seven charges arising out of
several incidents, including high speed chases from
police,
stealing
cars
and
possessing
methamphetamine, and he was ordered to pay
restitution The District Court, Salt Lake Department,
J Dennis Frederick, J, denied defendant's postjudgment motion for review heanng in which he
requested restitution heanng Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Davis, J, held that. (1)
defendant waived his entitlement to restitution
heanng, (2) tnal court did not effectively waive
defendant's waiver by holding heanng on defendant's
post-judgment motion; (3) tnal court adequately
stated its reasons for restitution order; and (4) record
allowed Court of Appeals to assume that tnal court
made appropnate findings relative to defendant's
financial condition.
Affirmed.
Billings, J , dissented with opinion.
West Headnotes
[ 1 ] Criminal Law <®=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
[1] Criminal Law <®=> 1147
110kll47
An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's
restitution order unless it exceeds that prescnbed by
law or otherwise abused its discretion.
[2] Sentencmg and Punishment <®=?2103
350Hk2103
Upon conviction of a crime which has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, the tnal court is statutonly mandated to
order the payment of restitution unless the court finds
that restitution is inappropnate.
UC.A.1953,
76-3-201(4).
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

Under both the United States and the State
Constitutions, due process requires criminal
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon
accurate and reasonably reliable information
U S C A. Const.Amend. 14, Const Art 1, § 7
[4] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>238
350Hk238
Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in
sentencing require that a defendant have the nght to
examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of
the factual information upon which his sentence is
based. U S C A. Const.Amend 14, Const. Art. 1, §
7
[5] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>240
3$0Hk240
Procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied when
defendant had a full opportunity to examine and
challenge all factual information upon which the court
based his sentence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14,
Const. Art. 1, §7.
[6] Sentencing and Punishment <®=»2201
350Hk2201
It is proper for the tnal court to impose restitution at
sentencing unless defendant objects to its imposition
and requests a full heanng on the amount at that time.
U.C.A.1953,76-3-201(4)(e).
[7] Sentencmg and Punishment <®=>2191
350Hk2191
Any request for a full restitution heanng must be
made at or before sentencmg.
UCA.1953,
76-3-201(4)(e).
[8] Sentencmg and Punishment <®^2201
350Hk2201
Defendant waived his entitlement to restitution
heanng, where he did not object, question or even
mention restitution at sentencmg, he was well aware
Ong. U S. Govt. Works
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of recommended restitution amount prior to
sentencing, and nothing in record suggested that
defendant lacked opportunity to object or request
hearing before, during or after court imposed the
recommended restitution amount. U.C.A.1953,
76-3-201(4)(e); Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 12(d).
[9] Sentencing and Punishment <§=>2201
350Hk2201
Trial court did not effectively waive defendant's
waiver of his entitlement to restitution hearing by
holding hearing on defendant's post-judgment motion
for review hearing, in which he requested restitution
hearing; court did not hold evidentiary hearing on
restitution amount or reconsider the restitution
amount on the merits, but rather merely clarified that
restitution amount ordered was based upon
presentence report. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(e).
[10] Criminal Law <@=>1134(6)
HOkl 134(6)
The Court of Appeals may affirm the trial court's
ruling if it is sustainable on any legal ground even if
different from that stated by the trial court.
[11] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^2134
350Hk2134
If trial court erroneously failed to consider
defendant's financial resources before ordering
restitution, defendant should have immediately
brought that error to the attention of the sentencing
judge. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(8)(c).
[12] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>2195
350Hk2195
In ordering restitution, trial court was not required by
statute to make findings on the record concerning
each
of
statutory
factors.
U.C.A.1953,
76-3-201(8)(b).

110k!126
Record allowed Court of Appeals to assume that trial
court made appropnate findings relative to
defendant's financial condition before ordering
restitution, where presentence report was part of the
record and relied upon by trial court, and trial court
did not impose a fine. U.C.A.1953, 76-3- 201(8)(c).
[15] Criminal Law <S=>1181.5(8)
110kll81.5(8)
When a record has not been made concerning the
reason for the amount of restitution, the appropriate
remedy is not to vacate the order of restitution but to
order the trial court to comply with the statute by
giving an explanation of its decision which
demonstrates that it has taken into account the
appropriate statutory factors.
U.C.A.1953,
76-3-201(4)(d)(i), (8)(b).
*112 Linda M. Jones and Scott C. Williams, Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Karen A.
Kkicznik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BILLINGS and
DAVIS, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
K 1 Appellant Lance Michael Weeks appeals the trial
court's denial of his post-judgment Motion For
Review Hearing in which he requested a restitution
hearing. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Trial court adequately stated its reasons for ordering
defendant to pay restitution, where court stated on
record that restitution was appropriate based on
defendant's criminal acts and his criminal history.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i).

K 2 Defendant pleaded guilty on July 6, 1999 to
seven charges arising out of several incidents
including high speed chases from the police, stealing
cars, and possessing methamphetamine. As part of a
plea bargain, the State dismissed several counts and
defendant agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges.
No promise was made as to defendant's prison time,
but the State made clear that it would request
consecutive terms.
No mention was made of
restitution during the plea colloquy.

[14] Criminal Law <§=> 1126

H 3 On September 10, 1999, defendant was sentenced

[13] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^2195
350Hk2195
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to zero-to-five-years for each offense to be served
concurrently
The judge "further orderfed] that
[defendant] pay restitution in the amount of
$9,104 35, [and] that [defendant] pay a recoupment
fee for the use of [defendant's] publicly provided
lawyer of $250 " It is clear that defendant read the
presentence report which set out the amount of
damages caused by him, however, none of the
parties, including defendant, discussed or objected to
the restitution order during sentencmg
f 4 Eleven days after sentencing, defendant filed a
Motion For Review Heanng in which he requested
that the court schedule "a Restitution [sic] hearing on
the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of
restitution claimed by the State " On October 18,
1999 the review heanng (which the court called a
"hearing incident to the defense motion for review to
determine appropnate restitution") was held At that
heanng, defendant's counsel stated that "there are
amounts that were being requested that weren't
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount
that
[wasn't] legally applicable."
The defense
attorney continued "I don't see those in the
presentence report. I don't know if your Honor had
an amount that you came up with at sentencing
because my files don't reflect the restitution." The
court replied by referencing amounts listed in the
presentence report. [FN1] The defense attorney
requested further documentation as to the factual
basis and support for those amounts.
FN1 The presentence report listed under
"restitution" the specific amounts of damage
and stated that the source of information
was the prosecutor's records, the three
victims, and Liberty Mutual Insurance.
U 5 The court then stated:
Given the circumstances, the time of the
sentencmg, the persuasive burden is upon the
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance of
the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the
sums sought for restitution are fair and
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that
bemg the presentence report, [ [FN2]] as well as
the orders m the matter, as well as now havmg
heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and
now [am] persuaded that preponderance of the
evidence burden has been met, that the number I
have ordered as restitution is fair and reasonable.
Consequently the motion to modify the~I will
characterize it as a motion to modify the order of

restitution is denied
FN2 The presentence report also lists
defendant's prior employment, the last being
a $5 50/hour job which ended in June 1997
As for his financial situation, the report
states that defendant has been incarcerated
"[a]nd therefore, has no income and no
expenses he has no debts and no assets,
either"
*113 The order denying defendant's motion was
entered on October 28, 1999, and defendant appeals
II ANALYSIS
% 6 Defendant makes three arguments (1) he was
entitled to a full restitution hearing, (2) the trial court
failed to make adequate findings pursuant to the
statutory factors when it ordered restitution, and (3)
there was plam error in the manner m which
restitution was ordered
D][2] 1 7 An appellate court will not disturb a tnal
court's restitution order "unless it exceeds that
prescnbed by law or otherwise abused its discretion."
St'Mte v Schweitzer, 943 P 2d 649, 653 (Utah
Ct App.1997). It is within the discretion of the tnal
court to impose sentence, which may mclude a fine,
restitution, probation or impnsonment. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) & (4) (1999); State v
Snyder, 747 P 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987) "However,
upon conviction of a crime which has resulted m
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, the tnal court is statutonly mandated to
order the payment of restitution unless the court finds
that restitution is mappropnate " Snyder, 747 P 2d at
420; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999)
[3][4][5] % 8 Under both the Umted States and the
Utah State Constitutions, due process requires
criminal proceedings including sentencmg to be
based upon accurate and reasonably reliable
information. See State v Gomez, 887 P 2d 853, 854
(Utah 1994).
Thus, "[fjundamental principles of
procedural fairness in sentencmg require that a
defendant have the nght to examine and challenge the
accuracy and reliability of the factual information
upon which his sentence is based." Id at 855
However, procedural fairness in sentencmg is
satisfied when "[defendant had a full opportunity
to examine and challenge all factual information upon
which the court based his sentence " Id
[6][7] 11 9 It is proper for the tnal court to impose
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restitution at sentencing unless defendant objects to
its imposition and requests a full hearing on the
amount at that time See Utah Code Ann § 76-3201(4)(e) (1999), State v Staxer 706 P 2d 611, 612
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) In this regard, Utah Code
Ann §76-3-201(4)(e) (1999) states "If the defendant
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the
issue " Id (emphasis added)
Thus, the statute is
clear-any request for a full restitution heanng must
be made at or before sentencing
Cf Monson v
Carver 928 P 2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (holding
no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant
did not object to order of restitution or request a
heanng ), State v Haga 954 P 2d 1284, 1289 (Utah
CtAppl998) (holding defendant entitled to full
restitution hearing where he requested it at
sentencing)
[8] U 10 Defendant did not object, question, or even
mention restitution at sentencing It is clear from the
record that defendant closely read the presentence
report which contained the recommended restitution
amount, which is the exact amount that the judge
adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the
recommended restitution amount. Nothing in the
record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the
court imposed that amount [FN3] Thus, because
defendant did not request a full restitution hearing at
or before sentencing and had no good cause not to
make the request, he waived his entitlement to a
restitution heanng
See Utah RCnm. P 12(d)
[FN4]
FN3 Defendant was not depnved of the
opportunity to cross examine witnesses or
have a restitution heanng, instead, he
waived that opportunity
FN4 The dissent suggests that timely
objection to proposed restitution and a
request for a full heanng thereon is not as
significant as timeliness in other areas,
thereby leaving the time within which a
restitution heanng could be requested
apparently open-ended
[9] U 11 Defendant argues that the tnal court, in
effect, waived his waiver because he asserts the
heanng on his motion after sentencmg amounted to a
restitution hearing *114 In support of his position
defendant cites to the following cases State v Seale,

853 P2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding when
issue raised in motion for new trial for first time and
court addressed issue on merits in denying motion
and considered alleged error rather than finding it
waived, defendant's right to assert issue on appeal
was resuscitated), State v Belgard 830 P 2d 264,
266 (Utah 1992) (holding when defendant waived
objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary
hearing granted and judge considered claim,
defendant's waiver was effectively waived by judge),
State v Johnson 821 P 2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991)
(concludmg when trial court addressed issue fully and
did not rely on waiver, issue will be considered on
appeal), State v Matsamas 808 P 2d 1048, 1053
(Utah 1991) (same), State v Dominguez 1999 UT
App 343, H 5, 992 P 2d 995 (holding defendant may
appeal order stemming from full restitution hearing,
even though motion for hearing filed ten days after
sentencing), State v Parker 872 P 2d 1041, 1044
(Utah Ct App 1994) (holding "trial court acted on the
ments of motion and thus de facto considered it
timely")
[10] U 12 However, these cases are all
distinguishable from this case
In this case, "[t]he
tnal court did not take evidence or hold an
evidentiary heanng on the issue, but mstead simply
denied the Motion to Alter or Amend," and, thereby,
did not waive defendant's earlier waiver of the
heanng Estate of Covington v Josephson, 888 P 2d
675, 678 n 5 (Utah Ct App 1994)
Here,
notwithstanding the tnal court's rmscharactenzation
of the heanng in its order, the court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the restitution amount, or
reconsider the restitution amount Instead, the court
merely clanfied that the restitution amount ordered
was based upon the presentence report No further
inquiry mto the restitution amount was made, no
evidence was taken, and the court did not address the
issue on the ments [FN5] Thus, because the court
did not conduct an evidentiary heanng or even
reconsider the restitution amount on the ments, there
was no resuscitation of defendant's earlier waiver

[FN6]
FN5 As in Covington, argument in support
of defendant's motion necessarily addressing
the ments thereof, should not be confused
with an evidentiary hearing See Estate of
Covington v Josephson 888 P 2d 675, 678
n 5 (Utah Ct App 1994)
FN6 The fact that the court did not
specifically rely on waiver as the basis for
denial of defendant's motion is of no
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consequence because we may affirm the
trial court's ruling 'if it is sustainable on any
legal ground even [if different]fromthat
stated by the tnal court ' Limb v Federated
Milk Producers Ass'n 23 Utah 2d 222, 461
P 2d 290, 293 n 2(1969)
U 13 Defendant next argues that the tnal court did not
make the appropriate findings when ordering
restitution
As for findings concerning restitution,
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(8)(b) (1999) states "In
determining the monetary sum and other conditions
for complete restitution, the court shall consider all
relevant facts, including (l) the cost of the damage or
loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense "
In addition, the court shall consider the financial
resources of the defendant, his ability to pay
restitution, and the means by which he can pay See
id § 76-3-201(8)(c)
[11] % 14 However, defendant never challenged the
restitution award, or the basis of the award during
sentencing, and he did not allege unusual
circumstances justifying his failure to do so "If the
tnal court, as defendant alleges, erroneously failed to
consider defendant's paltry financial resources before
ordering [restitution], defendant should have
immediately brought that error to the attention of the
sentencing judge If defendant was denied relief at
that time, he could have taken direct appeal" James
v Galetka, 965 P2d 567, 574 (Utah CtApp 1998)
(emphasis added), cert denied sub nom, James v
Warden, 982 P2d 88 (Utah 1999)
In addition,
"there is ample record evidence, from which the tnal
court could have found that restitution was proper"
State v Stayer, 706 P 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam)
K 15 Defendant's final argument is that it was plain
error for the tnal court to fail to consider the statutory
factors when restitution was ordered. Because the
tnal court was given the opportunity to correct the
*115 alleged error in the context of defendant's
motion, we will address the issue on appeal
[12][13] % 16 There was no reversible error here
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (1999) does not
require findings on the record concerning each of the
factors Unlike statutes that require findings on the
record, section 76-3-20l(8)(b) merely lists the factors
which must be considered, and contains no such
requirement
Instead, Utah Code Ann § 76-3201(4)(d)(i) (1999) states "If the court determines
that restitution is appropnate or inappropnate under

this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record " Here, the
trial court stated on the record that restitution was
appropnate based on defendant's cnminal acts and his
cnminal history
[14][15] K 17 Furthermore, the tnal court relied on
defendant's presentence report in determining
restitution As in State v Robertson 932 P 2d 1219
(Utah 1997), "[p]nor to the imposition of restitution
costs at the sentencing heanng, the tnal court
considered the information set forth in the
presentence report" Id at 1234, see also State v
Gomez 887 P 2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994) ("A copy of
the presentence investigation report was provided to
defendant pnor to [sentencing] Defendant had the
opportunity to examine the report and challenge its
contents and recommendations ") In Robertson the
supreme court also considered that the tnal court
"declined to impose any fine " Robertson 932 P 2d
at 1234 The Robertson court stated, "[although the
court did not make findings relating to [defendant's]
financial condition part of the record, we can
reasonably assume that the court actually made such
findings " Id at 1235 [FN7] Here, the presentence
refort was a part of the record and at the hearing on
defendant's waiver, the tnal court stated that it relied
on the report to determine the amount of restitution
Finally, the tnal court did not impose a fine,
therefore, based on the record, "we can reasonably
assume that the court made such findings " Id [FN8]
FN7 The Robertson court so held,
notwithstanding
language
therein,
apparently confusing the mandate of Utah
Code Ann § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i) (1997) with
the provisions of Utah Code Ann § 76-3201(8)(b)(1997)
FN8 Even if we were to conclude error
existed, the remedy would not be a
restitution heanng as defendant suggests
When a record has not been made
concerning the reason for the amount of
restitution, the appropnate remedy 'is not to
vacate the order of restitution' but to order
the tnal court to comply with the statute by
giving "an explanation of its decision which
demonstrates that it has taken into account
the appropnate statutory factors " Monson
v Carver, 928 P 2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996)

CONCLUSION
K 18 By not objecting to the restitution amount and
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requesting a hearing thereon at or prior to sentencing,
defendant waived his right to a fall restitution
hearing, and the trial court properly denied his
motion Furthermore, in accordance with the effect of
Robertson the recoid allows us to assume the court
made appropnate findings relative to defendant's
financial condition
K 19 I CONCUR
Presiding Judge

PAMELA T GREENWOOD,

BILLINGS, Judge (dissenting)
If 20 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
H 21 First, I disagree that Utah Code Ann §
76-3-201(4) requires a defendant to raise an objection
at the sentencing hearing "The purpose of requiring
a properly presented objection is to 'put[ ] the judge
on notice of the asserted error and allowf ] the
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of
the proceeding ' " State v Brown 856 P 2d 358, 359
(Utah Ct App 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting
Broberg v Hess
782 P 2d 198, 201 (Utah
Ct App 1989)) This policy is a general corollary of
our refusal to enterlain an issue for the first time on
appeal. The timeliness requirement of this doctrine
prevents undue delay in litigation
Accordingly,
objection to hearsay evidence, for example, must be
made at the time the evidence is proffered,
otherwise, the objection is waived.
K 22 The policy behind the timeliness requirement is
less significant when, as here, an objection
necessitates a separate evidentiary *116 hearing
[FN1] Inasmuch as no objection could be raised until
after imposition of restitution, I see no practical
difference between an objection raised at the
sentencing hearing and an objection raised eleven
days later-well before the time for direct appeal has
run
FN1 The State concedes that, had
Defendant
presented
his
objection
requesting an evidentiary hearing at his
original sentencing hearing, the restitution
hearing could not have taken place
immediately because witnesses would have
to have been subpoenaed, evidence
gatheied, and arguments prepared
K 23 I read the
economy but as
[FN2] This is
Restitution was

statute not as emphasizing judicial
emphasizing due process concerns
of particular concern in this case
ordered on the basis of damage
Copr © West 2001 No Claim

amounts
found
in
Defendants
presentence
investigation report [FN3]
Restitution was thus
based on undocumented double hearsay protfered by
the victims, and Defendant was deprived of the
opportunity to cross examine the victims as to either
the identity or valuation of the items stolen or the
reasonableness of the repair costs
FN2 Indeed, if the court thinks the statute
is concerned primarily with the timing of an
objection, it should require that the
objection be lodged a reasonable time
before the sentencing hearing so that the
trial court may 'at the time of sentencing
allow the defendant a full hearing on the
[restitution] issue '
Utah Code \nn §
76-3- 20l(4)(e) (1999) (emphasis added)
This is clearly not what the statute requires
FN3 One victim was awarded restitution of
S500 for unspecified personal property
stolen from a victims car Another victim
was awarded restitution of $1500 for a
stolen radio, damage to the radio wiring,
unspecified stolen personal property, and
scratches and dents to the car, although
repairs had not been effected and the
amounts were estimated by the victim
% 24 Even if section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) requires that an
objection be raised at sentencmg, I would hold that
the trial court waived any objection to the timeliness
of Defendant's motion
The record reveals the
following sequence of events
The trial court
sentenced and imposed restitution on Defendant on
September 10, 1999
On September 21, 1999,
eleven days later, Defendant filed in the District
Court the following "Motion for Review Hearing"
COMES NOW the Defendant,
LANCER
MICHEL WEEKS [sic], by and through his
counsel of record, MATTHEW G NIELSEN,
hereby requests pursuant to Utah Code Ann §
76-3-20l(4)(e) (1998), this Court to schedule a
Restitution hearing on the grounds that defendant
objects to the amount of restitution claimed by
the State
On September 30, 1999, the trial court issued a
"Notice of Restitution Hearing," and that hearing was
held on October 18, 1999 At the hearing, Defendant
argued that amounts ordered for restitution lacked
evidentiary support and requested documentation for
the damages and a hearing The State argued that the
amounts were reflected
in the presentence
investigation report and that the amounts, though
estimates, were reasonable
The trial court ruled
from the bench
Ong U S Govt Works
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Given the circumstances, the time of the
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance of
the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the
sums sought for restitution are fair and
reasonable
Given what I have reviewed, that being the
presentence report, as well as the orders in the
matter, as well as now having heard arguments of
counsel, I was persuaded and [am] now
persuaded that preponderance of the evidence
burden has been met, that die numbers I have
ordered as restitution is fair and reasonable
Consequently the motion to modify the--I will
charactenze it as a motion to modify the order of
restitution is denied
On October 28, 1999, the court entered an "Order
Re Restitution Hearing," which states The Court
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and
being otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
ongmal order m the Judgment and Commitment m
this case is the proper amount to be ordered as
restitution and hereby affirms that order and denies
defendant's motion
(Emphasis added)
H 25 I believe the foregoing establishes the trial court
did not rely on waiver but instead *117 addressed the
ments of Defendant's motion objecting to the amount
of restitution
Defendant requested a "review
hearing", the court scheduled a "restitution hearing",
the parties argued the validity of the evidentiary basis
of the restitution award, and the court ruled
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred by
reconsidering the order of restitution without giving
Defendant the required evidentiary hearing providing
an opportunity to present evidence and cross examine
witnesses
See Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(4)(e)
(1999) [FN4] Because the trial court did not provide
Defendant an evidentiary hearing, I would vacate the
restitution order and remand for an evidentiary
hearing on the amount of restitution.
FN4 Section 76-3-201 (4)(e) provides "If
the Defendant objects to the imposition,
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
court shall at the time of sentencing allow
the defendant a full hearing on the issue"
K 26 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion
that we need not remand for findings related to
Defendant's ability to pay the restitution assessed See
id The majority cites this court's opinion in James v

Galetka, 965 P 2d 567, 574 (Utah Ct App 1998) for
the proposition that remand is not required Galetka
is clearly distinguishable in that it involved a petition
for writ of habeas corpus filed three years after the
defendant's conviction, see id at 569, and the
defendant neither challenged the restitution during
sentencing nor appealed it See id at 574 Galetka
was decided under the well-established rule that
courts will not consider an issue on a petition for writ
of habeas corpus that could have been addressed at
trial or on direct appeal See id (citing Codianna v
Moms 660 P 2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)) Dicta in
Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an
objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my
opinion, persuasive
K 27 Additionally, the majority quotes selectively
from State v Stayer 706 P 2d 611 (Utah 1985), for
the proposition that we may assume the trial court
considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the
record supports the trial court's conclusion
However, the full quotefromStayer reads In the case
before us, there is ample record evidence, from which
the trial court could have found that restitution was
proper Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute
th^t the trial court's reasons be included as part of its
order, we believe that the failure to do so in this case
was harmless error Nonetheless, we draw attention
to this requirement for future guidance of the
sentencing courts
Id at 614 (emphasis added)
H 28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court make
clear that record findings under section 76-3-201 are
mandatory so that we may no longer assume that the
trial court considered the enumerated factors See
State v Robertson, 932 P 2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997)
(holding section 76-3-201 is exception to general rule
that appellate courts "uphold[ ] the trial court even if
it failed to make findings on the record whenever it
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually
made such findings"), Monson v Carver 928 P 2d
1017, 1028-29 (Utah 1996) (remanding for
explanation of statutory factors in restitution order
although defendant did not object to order)
% 29 Accordingly, although the trial court discussed
some of the statutory factors on the record, the court
did not explain on the record its evaluation of
Defendant's ability to pay
Under Robertson and
Monson, we cannot assume, as the majority does, that
the trial court considered factors it did not discuss on
the record
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^1 30 Finally, I wish to clarify potentially confusing
dicta in footnote three of the majonty opinion That
section of the majonty opinion purports to address
whether the tnal court committed plain error by not
granting an evidentiary hearing
Defendant's actual
argument, and the issue the majonty actually
addresses is whether the tnal court committed plain
error by not considenng the statutorily mandated
factors when evaluaiing restitution Although I agree
that remand for an evidentiary hearing for the latter
would not be required, see Monson 928 P 2d at 1028
(Utah 1996), [FN5] remand for an evidentiary *118
hearmg is clearly the remedy if the error was in
failing to hold a requested evidentiary heanng
See
State v Haga
954 P 2d 1284, 1289 (Utah
CtApp 1998)

FN5 The Monson court remanded the
matter to the Board of Pardons and Parole
with instructions to comply with the
[restitution] statute by giving [defendant] an
explanation of its decision which
demonstrates that it has taken into account
the appropriate statutory factors Monson
928 P2d at 1028
The court did not
remand for an evidentiary heanng because it
held that Monson had not requested a
hearing from the board, but only made that
request in a subsequent habeas corpus
petition to the distnct court
See id at
1029
U 31 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the
majority opinion
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah

favor of factual finding that he was malingering and
then demonstrating that, even viewing evidence in
light most favorable to court below, that evidence was
insufficient to support court's finding

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Jerry Lee ROBERTSON, Defendant and Appellant
No 940374
Feb 18,1997
Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake Division I, Michael Murphy, J, of murder
and theft Defendant appealed The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman C J , held that (1) evidence supported
determination, upon filing of competency petition,
that defendant was malingering, (2) trial court's
failure to enter formal stay dunng rwo-week period in
which competency petition was pending was harmless
error, (3) marital testimonial privilege did not
preclude testimony by defendant's former wife, (4)
marital communication privilege did not preclude
testimony by former wife, (5) former's wife's
testimony that "everybody knew what would happen
should he act crazy" did not depnve defendant of fair
trial, (6) trial court's refusal to give proposed
reasonable doubt instructions was not reversible
error, and (7) imposition of restitution for extradition
costs required discussion, on record, of reasons
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
Steward, Associate C J , dissented and filed opinion
in which Durham, J , concurred

Trial court's determination, upon filing of petition
pertaining to defendant's competency to stand trial,
that defendant was malingering was supported by
evidence that defendant laughed and joked during
extradition trip, exhibiting no signs of speaking
difficulties, that defendant showed markedly different
speaking ability depending on whether he was being
formally observed or merely dealing with staff at state
hospital, and that results of three intelligence quotient
(IQ) tests for defendant varied dramatically, with
reason attributed to defendant's uncooperative and
faking behavior U C A 1953, 77-15-1, 77-15-2
[5] Criminal Law <£=> 1144 1
110kll44 1
[5J Criminal Law <®=* 1158(1)
110kll58(l)
When factual issues are presented to and must be
resolved by trial court, but no findings of fact appear
in record, Supreme Court assumes that trier of fact
found them in accord with its decision, and Court
affirms decision if from evidence it would be
reasonable to find facts to support it
[6] Criminal Law <@=*737(1)
110k737(l)

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law <£=>735
110k735
Determination of whether defendant is competent to
proceed to trial is mixed question of fact and law
[2] Criminal Law <@=>734
110k734
Proper interpretation of statutory standard
competency to stand trial is question of law

[4] Criminal Law <®=^625 15
110k625 15

for

[3] Criminal Law <§=> 1130(2)
HOkl 130(2)
Defendant who claimed incompetency to stand trial
bore burden, on appeal, of marshaling all evidence in

If governing statute explicitly provides that trial court
must make written findings of fact regarding
particular matter, then court's failure to make these
findings may constitute error, even if it would be
reasonable to conclude that judge intended to make
them
[7] Criminal Law <§=> 1144 1
110kll44 1
If Supreme Court has previously determined that trial
court must make written findings on issue to assure
that materiality of question is impressed on trial judge
so as to enable Court to perform properly its appellate
review function, then Court will not assume that trial
court made findings
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[8] Criminal Law <£=> 1166( 12)
HOkl 166(12)

spouse
502(a)

Trial court's failure to enter explicit finding, in
relation to competency petition, that defendant was
competent to stand trial did not constitute reversible
error, given that no explicit legislative directive
existed to make written findings with regard to issue,
that court explicitly considered and rejected all of
defendant's contentions that he was incompetent to
proceed, and that record was entirely consistent with
finding of competency U C A 1953, 77-15-2

[15] Statutes <®^ 188
361kl88

[9] Criminal Law <§==> 1144 1
110kll44 1
If appellant fails to provide adequate record on
appeal, Supreme Court must assume regularity of
proceedings below
[ 10] Criminal Law <§=> 1162
110kll62
Erroneous decision by trial court cannot result in
reversible error unless error is harmful.

Const Art 1, § 12, Rules of Evid, ^ale

[15] Statutes <@=* 190
361kl90
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
Supreme Court will not look beyond it to divine
legislative intent, instead, Court is guided by rule that
statute should be construed according to its plain
language
[16] Witnesses <®==>75
410k75
Marital testimonial privilege is to be invoked, if at all,
only by spouse whom state seeks to compel to testify
Const Art. 1, § 12, Rules of Evid., Rule 502(a).
[17] Witnesses <®=>64(1)
410k64(l)
Mental testimonial privilege did not preclude
testimony by defendant's former wife who was not
compelled to testify. Const. Art. 1, § 12, Rules of
Evid., Rule 502(a).

[ 11 ] Criminal Law <S=> 1162
110kll62
"Harmless error" is error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
that it affected outcome of proceedings.
[ 12] Criminal Law <®=> 1163( 1)
110kll63(l)

[18] Statutes <@=>211
361k211

Burden of showing harmfiilness from trial court error
normally rests with complaining party.

Supreme Court may look to title of legislation to
clarify meaning of ambiguous statutory language, but
title cannot be used to contradict or defeat plainly
expressed intent or to create ambiguity or uncertainty
when language of body of act is clear.

[13] Criminal Law <3=>1166(12)
HOkl 166(12)

[19] Witnesses <§=> 195
410kl95

Trial court's failure to enter formal stay during twoweek penod in which petition pertaining to
defendant's competency to stand trial was pending
was harmless error, where defendant was in fact
competent to stand trial. UC.A.1953, 77-15-5(6)
(1993).

[19] Witnesses <@=>217
410k217

[14] Witnesses <§=>52(1)
410k52(l)

Marital communication privilege may be asserted by
either spouse, even following dissolution of marriage
UCA.1953, 78-24-8(1); Rules of Evid, Rule
502(b).
[20] Witnesses <3=> 190
410kl90

Marital testimonial privilege permits husband or wife
to refuse to testify in court about any matter against
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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defendant's former wife from testifying about
defendant's marital statements which were made in
course of plan to commit or commission of crime.
UCA1953, 78-24-8(1),
Rules of Evid, Rule
502(b)(4)(B)

Art 1,§ 12
[26] Criminal Law <@=>769
110k769
Trial court has duty to instruct jury on law applicable
to facts of the case

[21] Courts <@=>85(1)
106k85(l)
Rules of evidence and procedure promulgated by
Supreme Court under its constitutional power operate
to supersede inconsistent statutory provisions.
[22] Criminal Law <§=* 1155
1lOkl155
Supreme Court will not reverse trial court's denial of
motion for mistrial absent abuse of discretion.

[27] Criminal Law <§=>770(1)
110k770(l)
Defendant has nght to have his theory of case
presented to jury in clear and comprehensible
manner
[28] Criminal Law <£=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
Whether trial court's refusal to give proposed jury
instruction constitutes error is question of law, which
Supreme Court may review for correctness.

[23] Criminal Law <@=>867
110k867
When deciding motion for mistrial, trial court must
determine whether incident may have or probably
influenced jury, to the prejudice of defendant; if in
exercising its discretion, court concludes that incident
probably did not prejudice jury, court should deny
motion.

[29] Criminal Law <®=>829(1)
110k829(l)
It ip not error to refuse proposed instruction if point is
properly covered in other instructions.
[30] Criminal Law <®=>822(1)
110k822(l)

[24] Criminal Law <@=> 1155
HOkllSS
Unless review of record shows that trial court's
decision denying motion for mistrial is plainly wrong
in that disputed incident so likely influenced jury that
defendant cannot be said to have had fair trial,
Supreme Court will not find that court's decision was
abuse of discretion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6;
Const. Art. 1, § 12.
[25] Criminal Law <§=>867
110k867
Testimony by defendant's former wife that
"everybody knew what would happen should he act
crazy" and prosecutor's subsequent admonishment to
wife that proceedings had been "sanitized" did not
depnve defendant of fair trial, even though defendant
claimed incompetency to stand trial and comments
could have implied that defendant had feigned mental
illness to avoid prosecution, where trial court struck
wife's statement and instructed jury to disregard it,
and court determined that prosecutor's comment was
not heard by jury. U S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; Const.
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

Supreme Court reviews jury instructions in their
entirety and will affirm when instructions taken as
whole fairly instruct jury on law applicable to case.
[31] Criminal Law <®=>789(4)
110k789(4)
Standard for reviewmg appropriateness of reasonable
doubt instruction involves three-part test, instruction
should specifically state that state's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt, instruction should not
state that reasonable doubt is one which would
govern or control person in the more weighty affairs
of life, and instruction should not instruct that
reasonable doubt is not merely possibility, although it
is permissible to instruct that fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
[32] Criminal Law <@=>829(18)
110k829(18)
Trial court's refusal to give proposed reasonable
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doubt instructions, both of which included instruction
on theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, did
not constitute reversible error, where instruction
given was appropriate statement of law, instruction
which was given contained clear and unambiguous
statement that State's proof had to obviate all
reasonable doubt instruction did not define
reasonable doubt in terms of the "more weighty
decisions in life," and instruction articulated
appropriate definition of reasonable doubt
[33] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>2103
350Hk2103
(Formerly 110kl208 4(2))
Imposition of restitution is matter left to discretion of
court
[34] Extradition and Detainers <S=^40
166k40
Imposition of restitution for extradition costs required
discussion, on record, of reasons
U CA 1953,
76-3-201(4)(b)(i), <4)(c)(i), (4)(d)(i), 77-32a- 1,
77-32a-3
[35] Criminal Law <@=>1166(1)
HOkl 166(1)
Imposing restitution of costs incurred to house
defendant in state hospital during his penod of
malingering, without specifically stating that
defendant's financial condition was considered, was
not reversible error, where trial court's actions at
sentencing hearing indicated that court considered
defendant's financial resources
UCA1953,
76-3-201(4)(c)(i), 77-15- 9(4), 77-32a-3
*1221 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen, Marian Decker, Asst
Att'y Gen, Howard Lemke, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff
*1222 Mary C Corporon, Kelhe F Williams, Salt
Lake City, for defendant.

stay all proceedings against him subsequent to the
filing of a petition for inquiry into competency (iv)
admitting his former wife's testimony against him
(v) failing to grant a mistrial following allegedly
prejudicial statements made in the jury's presence,
(vt) failing to give the jury his proposed reasonable
doubt instruction and failing to instruct the jury on the
theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, and (vn)
abusing its discretion in ordering restitution costs
We have jurisdiction to hear Robertson's claims
because this case is an appeal from a "district court
involving a conviction of a first degree
felony"
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3)(i)
We affirm the
conviction but remand for further proceedings
regarding restitution of extradition costs
In late October of 1991, Robertson and his wife,
Cassie, were living on the streets in Salt Lake City,
Utah, when they met Gerald Thomas at the Salvation
Army Thomas offered to let Robertson and Cassie
stay with him m his apartment for a few days They
stayed with Thomas for approximately five days On
the last day, Robertson and Thomas began to argue
While Thomas was in the bathroom, Robertson told
Cassie that he was going to "take him out" After
Thpmas went to bed, Robertson told Cassie to knock
Thomas out by hitting him in the head with a
hammer Cassie located a claw hammer in Thomas's
apartment while Robertson went through Thomas's
wallet While Thomas slept, Cassie struck Thomas
once in the left side of his head with the hammer
Thomas immediately sat up and exclaimed, "Oh
God1" Robertson took the hammer from Cassie and
struck Thomas in the head approximately eleven
times Thomas died as a result of the hammer blows
to his head
Both Robertson and Cassie were apprehended in
Fresno, California, for Thomas's murder They were
subsequently extradited to Utah
Cassie, who
pleaded guilty to murder, was serving a five-to-hfe
prison term at the time of Robertson's trial
Robertson and Cassie were divorced on September
14, 1992

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Jerry Lee Robertson appeals his 1994 jury conviction
for murder and theft and the trial court's subsequent
imposition of restitution costs totaling approximately
$60,000 Robertson claims that the trial court made
numerous errors during his trial, including (l) finding
him competent to proceed to trial without making
adequate findings of fact, (n) failing to hold a
hearing on the issue of competency, (in) failing to

On June 8, 1992, Robertson filed a competency
petition claiming that he was not competent to stand
trial The trial court appointed Drs Linda Gummow
and Vickie Gregory to examine Robertson
Both
examiners concluded that Robertson was incompetent
to stand trial The State stipulated to the examiners'
findings, and the trial court committed Robertson to
the Utah State Hospital on June 26, 1992 The court
ordered the State Hospital to provide documentation
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regarding Robertson's progress toward competency
On April 23, 1993, a State Hospital administrator
sent a letter to the trial court indicating that Robertson
was competent to stand trial
The court had also
received reports from State Hospital doctors
indicating that Robertson was malingering Pursuant
to this information, the State moved to have
Robertson transported from the State Hospital to the
county jail to await further proceedmgs.
The trial court held several evidentiary hearings on
the issue of Robertson's malingering
After
considering the evidence, the court determined that
Robertson was "feigning" his symptoms
The
commitment order was vacated Having vacated the
commitment order, the court determined that a "state
of equipoise" then existed regarding Robertson's
competence to proceed The court then proceeded
"as i f the commitment order "had never been
forthcoming"
Robertson had the nght and
opportunity to raise the issue of competency again,
but the court noted that he had the burden of proof.
Represented by new counsel, Robertson filed a
second competency petition on March 3, 1994 The
tnal court denied the petition, finding that Robertson's
promise of future cooperation with mental health
experts was *1223 not credible
The court did,
however, permit a further mental evaluation to be
conducted, on condition that the evaluation not delay
the tnal and that the parties stipulate to the evaluator
The parties stipulated to the appointment of Dr Louis
Moench.
Dr Moench examined Robertson and
concluded that he was feigning incompetency.
On another front, Robertson made a pretrial motion
to exclude from the forthcoming tnal all testmiony of
his former wife, Cassie
The court denied
Robertson's motion.
During tnal, Cassie made a
statement that could be construed as referring to
Robertson's "acting" crazy. Robertson moved for a
new tnal, arguing that the statements had tainted the
jury The tnal court concluded that the ambiguous
remark did not taint the jury and denied the motion.
Following a four-day tnal, Robertson was convicted
of murder and theft. The court imposed a term of
five years to life for murder and one to fifteen years
for theft
Additionally, the court miposed
approximately $60,000 m restitution costs on
Robertson to cover the expenses mcident to
extradition and housmg Robertson at the State
Hospital during his penod of malingering.

Robertson claims that the trial court erred by (I)
finding him competent to proceed to trial without
making adequate findings of fact, (u) failing to hold
a hearing on the issue of competency, (in) failing to
stay all proceedmgs against him subsequent to the
filing of a petition for inquiry into competency, (IV)
admitting his former wife's testimony against him,
(v) failing to grant a mistnal following allegedly
prejudicial statements made in the jury's presence,
(vi) failing to give the jury his proposed reasonable
doubt instruction and failing to instruct the jury on the
theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis, and (vn)
abusing its discretion in ordenng restitution costs
We will address these claims seriatim
Regarding the handling of his petition for inquiry
into his competency, Robertson raises three claims of
error His three claims can be addressed under two
headmgs first, that the tnal court erced substantively
when it concluded that he was competent and, second,
that the court failed to follow the correct procedures
in that it did not hold a proper heanng on the issue of
competency and it refused to stay all proceedings
against him subsequent to the filing of his petition.
On the ments of the competency issue, under section
77-15-2 of the Code, [FN1] the tnal court must
determine whether an accused has the ability to
understand the nature of the proceedmgs and the
potential punishment and has the ability to assist
counsel in his or her defense [FN2] Robertson
essentially argues that the court arbitranly rejected
the analyses and conclusions of the two courtappointed examiners who testified that he was
incompetent in favor of the other witnesses who
claimed he was feigning.
FN 1 Section 77-15-2 of the Code states
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering
from a mental disorder or mental retardation
resulting either in
(1) his inability to have a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings
against him or of the punishment specified
for the offense charged, or (2) his inability
to consult with his counsel and to
participate in the proceedings against him
with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding
FN2 This determination is mandated by
section 77-15-1 of the Code, which
provides, "No person who is incompetent to
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proceed shall be tried or punished for a
public offense"
[1][2][3] The determination of whether a defendant
is competent to proceed to trial is a mixed question of
fact and law State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239, 1243
(Utah 1988)
The trial court's factual findings in
support of its determination of malingering and its
accompanying credibility determinations are subject
to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Utah
RCivP 52(a), Lafferty, 749 P 2d at 1244. The
proper interpretation of the statutory standard for
competency is a question of law. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
at 1243
Before this court, Robertson essentially
challenges the trial court's findings of fact.
Therefore, Robertson bears the burden of marshaling
all the evidence in favor of the factual finding that he
was malingering and then demonstrating that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the *1224 court below, that evidence is insufficient to
support the court's findmg Saunders v Sharp, 806
P 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam).
The court-appointed doctors who performed the
competency evaluations on Robertson acknowledged
that patient cooperation was very important in
diagnosing competency and that without cooperation
any test result was questionable.
Dr. Gummow
stated that the tests she administered required
Robertson's complete honesty and that she would not
have picked up on a consistent he from Robertson.
In fact, Dr. Gummow conceded that Robertson's
reluctance to talk about the murder could be
attributed to choice rather than to inability.
Dr.
Gregory also acknowledged that the validity of all
testing hinged on Robertson's honesty and that there
was a possibility that he had not been entirely honest
with her. Thus, by their own testimony, if Robertson
had been consistently dishonest with Drs. Gummow
and Gregory, their determination that Robertson was
incompetent is unreliable.
[4] The record reveals ample evidence supporting the
trial court's determination of malingering. One of the
primary symptoms of mental incompetency relied
upon by Drs. Gregory and Gummow was Robertson's
inability to express or understand verbal
communications. The record is replete with evidence
of faking on this pomt. The Salt Lake City Police
Department detective who escorted Robertson from
Fresno, California, to Salt Lake City testified that
Robertson laughed and joked during the trip,
exhibiting no signs of speaking difficulties.
Likewise, a registered nurse at the State Hospital
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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testified that Robertson showed markedly different
speaking ability, depending upon whether he was
being formally observed or merely dealing with staff
A clinical worker from the State Hospital made
similar observations
Indeed, this clinical worker
overheard Robertson talking on the phone with his
lawyers using monosyllabic responses and a dragging
speech pattern, only to revert back to a livelier speech
pattern when the call ended. The clinical worker
testified that when she confronted Robertson, he
responded by stating that his lawyers "knew that this
was an act."
The trial court also heard evidence from other
doctors who had observed Robertson
Dr Bert
Cundick evaluated Robertson with multiple I Q tests
Robertson's results on these tests varied dramatically
Dr
Cundick attributed this discrepancy to
Robertson's uncooperative and faking behavior Dr
Cundick therefore concluded that Robertson was
malingering and was competent to stand trial
Additionally, Drs Gerald Berge, Robert Howell, and
Anthony Gillette all testified to observing behavior
that led them to conclude that Robertson was feigning
incompetency.
Finally, on the basis of its own
observations and Robertson's responses to rn-court
questioning, the trial court found that Robertson had
malingered and would contmue to
feign
incompetency. From the foregoing, we cannot
conclude that the trial court's determination that
Robertson was feigning incompetency was clearly
erroneous.
The court did not, however, enter a finding that
Robertson was competent. Robertson asserts that this
omission necessitates a reversal of his conviction
Robertson argues that section 77-15-2 of the Code,
which defines the legal standard of competency,
requires the court to enter specific findings regarding
whether he is competent. We reject this argument.
[5][6][7] Under our decision m State v Ramirez,
when "factual issues are presented to and must be
resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact
appear in the record, we 'assume that the trier of [the]
facts found them in accord with its decision, and we
affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be
reasonable to find facts to support it.' " 8 1 7 P.2d 774,
787 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mower v McCarthy, 122
Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)) (additional
citations omitted). However, there are mstances in
which the application of the Ramirez assumption
would be inappropriate. For instance, in Ramirez
itself we said, "If the ambiguity of the facts makes
Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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this assumption unreasonable, we will remand for a
new trial" Id at 788 (citations omitted) In addition,
if a governing statute explicitly provides that the trial
court must make written findings of fact *1225
regarding a particular matter, then the court's failure
to make these findings may constitute error, even if it
would be reasonable to conclude that the judge
intended to make them State v Labrum 925 P 2d
937 939-40 (Utah 1996) Moreover, if this court has
previously determined that the tnal court must make
written findings on an issue to assure that the
materiality of the question is impressed on the tnal
judge so as to enable this court to perform properly
its appellate review function, then we will not assume
that the court made the findings See e g State v
Eldredge 773 P 2d 29, 34 (Utah) (requmng trial
court to enter findings and conclusions regarding
admission of hearsay testimony of child victims m sex
abuse cases), cert denied sub nom Eldredge v Utah
493 U S 814, 110 SCt 62, 107 L Ed 2d 29 (1989),
State v Nelson 725 P 2d 1353, 1355-56 n 3 (Utah
1986) (same) We do not face any of these situations
here
The sections relied upon by Robertson m support of
his argument that the court erred by failing to make
findings regardmg his competency do not contain an
explicit legislative directive to make wntten findings
Section 77-15-2 of the Code merely defines
incompetency in simple terms, it makes no reference
whatsoever to a duty of the tnal court to make any
wntten findings on the issue Section 77-15-6 [FN3]
provides the procedures to be followed if a defendant
is found incompetent Section 77-15-6( 1) states
FN3 This section was amended in 1994,
effective May 2, 1994 Incompetent
Defendants Amendments, ch 162, § 5, 1994
Utah Laws 728-30 This amendment
substantially rewrote the procedures to be
followed after a defendant has been found
incompetent
The current version of
section 77- 15-6 provides m pertinent part
(4) [T]he court shall hold a heanng to
determine the defendant's current status
At the heanng, the burden of proving that
the defendant is competent is on the
proponent of competency Following the
hearing, the court shall determine by a
preponderance of evidence whether the
defendant is
(a) competent to stand tnal,
(5) (a) If the court enters a finding pursuant
to Subsection (4)(a), the court shall proceed
with the tnal or such other procedures as

may be necessary to adjudicate the charges
All subsequent citations are to section
77-15-6 as it stood prior to the 1994
amendment
[I]f after hearing, the person is found to be
incompetent, the court shall order him committed
to the Utah State Hospital or to another mental
health facility until the court that committed him
or the distnet court of the county where he is
confined, after notice and hearing, finds that he is
competent to proceed
This section likewise does not require the trial court
to make specific wntten findmgs of fact
The
statutes relied upon by Robertson, thus, unlike the
statute in Labrum do not require written findings
concerning the vanous definitional aspects of
incompetency found in section 77-15-2 Furthermore
no prior case has mandated that a tnal court make
wntten findmgs on this issue
Therefore, we now
proceed to determine whether the facts of this case
support the Ramirez assumption that the tnal court
found that Robertson was competent
The tnal court explicitly determined that Robertson
was feigning incapacity to comprehend and
communicate Because Drs Gummow and Gregory
had found Robertson incompetent on the basis of his
inability to comprehend and communicate, the court
determined that their findmgs of incompetency were
m ereor The court therefore vacated its commitment
order, which had been based solely on their
evaluations of Robertson
When Robertson agam
raised the issue of competency, the tnal court demed
his petition, which did not allege any facts of
incompetency that the court had not already
determined to be a product of Robertson's feigning
Having found that Robertson's claim of incompetency
was not credible, the court proceeded with the trial
Implicit m the court's decision to proceed with the
tnal after it determined that Robertson was merely
feigning his "symptoms" of incompetency is a
determination that Robertson was competent
Indeed, that the court actually made this implicit
finding of competency is strongly supported by the
court's comments on the jury's verdict at the
sentencmg heanng The court stated that "because of
the alternatives that [the jury] rejected m terms of
guilty and mentally ill, their view is consistent with
my view and that is, that *1226 the defendant was
competent to proceed " (emphasis added)
[8] Here, the tnal court explicitly considered and
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rejected all of Robertson's contentions that he was
incompetent to proceed, and because the record is
entirely consistent with a finding of competency, we
can safely apply the Ramirez assumption and
conclude that the court found Robertson competent
We therefore uphold the trial court's decision to
proceed with the trial
Robertson next claims that the trial court failed to
follow the correct procedures m dealing with his
second competency petition. Specifically, Robertson
argues first that the trial court did not hold the hearing
required by section 77-15-5(1) of the Code and
second that it did noi stay all proceedings pending the
disposition of the petition, as required by section
77-15-5(6) [FN4] Section 77-15-5(1) provides,
"When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3,
the court shall enter an order for a hearing on the
mental condition of the person who is the subject of
the petition" Section 77-15-5(6) states, "All other
proceedings pending against the defendant shall be
stayed until the proceedings to determine his mental
condition are terminated."
FN4 Robertson's arguments concerning the
trial court's failure to hold a hearing or stay
the proceedings are based on the current
version of section 77-15-5 This section,
however, was amended in 1994, and the
amendment became effective May 2, 1994
Incompetent Defendants Amendments ch.
162, § 4, 1994 Utah Laws 726-28 This
amendment modified the provisions dealing
with the hearing and stay requirements
Section 77- 15-5 now provides in relevant
part
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to
Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of the
defendant's competency to stand trial , the
court in which proceedings are pending
shall i>tay all proceedings
The district
court in which the petition is filed shall pass
upon the sufficiency of the allegations of
incompetency If a petition is opposed by
either party, the court shall, prior to
granting or denying the petition, hold a
limited hearing solely for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of the petition
If the court finds that the allegations of
incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to
the defendant's competency to stand trial, it
shall enter an order for a hearing on the
mental condition of the person who is the
subject of the petition
Utah Code Ann § 77-15-5 (emphasis
added) As this version did not become
effective until after the trial court's
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dismissal of Robertson s second petition on
March 17, 1994, our analysis and all
subsequent citations are to section 77-15-5
as it stood prior to the 1994 amendment
[9] Responding to the first argument, we note that
section 77-15-5(1) directs that if a petition asserting a
lack of competency "is filed pursuant to Section
77-15-3, the court shall enter an order for a hearing
on the mental condition of the person who is the
subject of the petition." This statute is written in
mandatory rather than permissive language, as it
states that "the court shall enter an order for a
hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15- 5(1) (emphasis
added)
The trial court satisfied this hearing
requirement by holding a hearing on March 17, 1994,
to consider Robertson's second competency petition
On appeal, Robertson has failed to make the
transcript of the March 17 hearing part of the record.
Thus, we cannot determine whether the court
complied with the requirement of section 77-15-5(5)
that "[t]he heanng ... be conducted according to the
procedures outlmed in Subsections 62A-12234(9)(b) through (9)(f)." As we stated in Jolivet v
Cook, " 'If an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, this Court must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below.' " 784 P 2d
1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (quotmg State v Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986)), cert denied sub nom
Jolivet v Barnes, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S Ct. 751, 107
L.Ed.2d 767 (1990).
Therefore, we reject
Robertson's argument that the court erred by failing to
hold a heanng.
Robertson's second procedural attack on the trial
court's handlmg of his second petition concerns the
court's failure to enter a formal stay while the petition
was pending, as required by section 77-15-5(6) of the
Code. That section provides, "All other proceedmgs
pending against the defendant shall be stayed until the
proceedmgs to determine his mental condition are
terminated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(6). Here,
the trial court did not enter such a stay Rather, the
court scheduled hearings on additional motions and
set the date for the jury trial. We agree that in so
actmg, the court failed to follow the statute.
*1227 [10][11][12][13] However, having determined
that error was committed, we must address its
harmfulness. An erroneous decision by a trial court
"cannot result m reversible error unless the error is
harmful." State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 240 (Utah
1992). Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
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that it affected the outcome of the proceedings Id
Put differently, an error is harmful only if the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high
that it undermines our confidence in the verdict Id
The burden of showing harmfulness normally rests
with the complaining party See Ashton v Ashton
733 P2d 147 (Utah 1987) (citing Redevelopment
Agency v Mitsui Inv Inc 522 P 2d 1370, 1374 & n
12 (Utah 1974)), see also State v Bishop 753 P 2d
439, 448 (Utah 1988) (holding that "appellant has the
burden of establishing that reversible error resulted
from an abuse of discretion") Robertson has failed
to carry this burden
Robertson filed his second competency petition on
March 3 1994 On March 17, the trial court denied
the petition Robertson argues that the prejudice he
suffered from the lack of a stay dunng this two-week
period is clear
However, the only prejudice he
claims is that he was in fact incompetent to proceed
to trial dunng this period (and afterward) We have
already affirmed the trial court's rejection of this
claim and the demal of the petition, therefore, we
find no reason for concluding that the jury's verdict
might have differed on the ultimate question of guilt
had the trial judge formally stayed all proceedings for
two weeks, as required by the statute [FN5] Because
we find the trial court's error to have been harmless,
we reject this leg of Robertson's challenge to his
conviction
FN5 Although Robertson has not proven
that he was prejudiced by this error, we
nevertheless stress the importance of
following the statutory requirements for
determining competency to stand trial
We now consider Robertson's claim of error
regarding the admission of Cassie Robertson's
testimony against him during trial Robertson argues
that the trial court erred in allowing his former wife,
Cassie Robertson, to testify against him.
Before
trial, Robertson moved to exclude Cassie's testimony
His motion was based on article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution, which prevents the State from
compelling a husband or wife to testify against his or
her spouse, and section 78-24-8(1) of the Code,
which under most circumstances requires the consent
of one spouse to permit the examination of the other
regarding any communication made by one to the
other dunng marnage The court denied the motion
on the grounds that the pnvilege under the
constitution belonged solely to the witness spouse and
that section 78- 24-8(1) was inapplicable.
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Before this court, Robertson argues that the marital
privileges recognized by Utah law may be asserted by
either the accused spouse or the testifying spouse
Robertson relies on article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and rule 502(a) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, the provisions recognizing a marital
testimonial pnvilege, and section 78-24-8(1) of the
Code and rule 502(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which recognize marital communication privileges
To simplify our analysis, we will discuss these
provisions according to the type of privilege the
provisions recognize
[14] We begin with the provisions granting a marital
testimonial pnvilege Marital testimonial privileges
permit a husband or wife to refuse to testify in court
about any matter against his or her spouse
The
traditional justifications for this privilege have been
the prevention of marital dissension and the "natural
repugnance in every fair-minded person to
compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the
other's condemnation"
8 John H Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2228
(McNaughton rev 1961) If a husband or wife could
be^compelled to testify against his or her spouse, the
testifying spouse would be placed in the unenviable
position of either committing perjury or testifying to
matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse,
which could clearly lead to mantal stnfe
Mantal
testimonial pnvileges avoid this moral hazard by
permitting a spouse to refuse to testify
*1228 The testimonial pnvileges found in article I,
section 12 and rule 502(a) are identical
The rule
merely repeats verbatim the constitutional provision
That provision states that "a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife " Utah Const art I, § 12
(emphasis added), see also Utah R Evid 502(a)
[15][16][17] We use our general rules of statutory
construction to interpret these provisions "Where
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative
intent" Eg, Alhsen v American Legion Post No
134, 763 P2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) "Instead, we
are guided by the rule that a statute should be
construed accordmg to its plam language " Id The
quoted language from article I, section 12 and rule
502(a) is clear and unambiguous on its face that the
mantal pnvilege is to be invoked, if at all, only by the
spouse whom the state seeks to compel to testify
This interpretation is confirmed by the advisory
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committee note to rule 502 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, which states, "Absent constitutional
change, the rule repeats the state constitutional
testimonial privilege for criminal cases in
subparagraph (a), to be asserted or waived by the
witness spouse"
Utah R Evid 502 advisory
committee's note (emphasis added)
Cassie was
neither compelled to testify nor married to Robertson
at the time she testified against him
[18] Robertson attempts to avoid the plain reading of
the constitutional language by arguing that the
provision must be interpreted in light of the words
"[rjights of the accused" contained m the title to
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
He
contends that this statement of purpose requires that
we hold that the defendant "accused" spouse has the
right to assert a testimonial privilege on behalf of his
former wife who voluntarily testified This argument
is wholly without merit
While it is true that this
court may look to the title of legislation to clarify the
meaning of ambiguous language, the title cannot be
used "to contradict or defeat a plainly expressed
intent" or "to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when
the language of the body of the act is clear " Great
Salt Lake Auth v Island Ranching Co 18 Utah 2d
45, 414 P2d 963, 964-65 (1966)
As we noted
above, the explicit text of article I, section 12 deals
only with compelled testimony of one spouse against
the other Because the language of article I, section
12 is plain and unambiguous, this court will not rely
on the title of this provision to try to create an
ambiguity
Robertson has a further argument that rule 502(a)
gives him the nght to prevent Cassie from testifying
While the language of rule 502(a) is identical with the
constitution and is, therefore, silent on whether the
privilege may be claimed by the one called to testify,
rule 502(b) states that either spouse may claim the
quite different marital communications privilege
described there
Robertson argues that we should
construe rule 502(a) in light of rule 502(b)'s express
bestowal on both spouses of the nght to claim the
marital communications privilege
We reject this
argument As we note below, the privileges described
in rule 502(a) and (b) are entirely different in concept
and origin There is no basis for thinking that the
drafters intended to expand rule 502(a)'s scope
beyond the constitution's reach
Robertson
recognizes the fundamental identity of article I,
section 12 and rule 502(a) when he admits that the
rule does not import the exceptions drafted into
502(b)'s language
We find that rule 502(a) is

neither narrower nor broader than article I, section 12
's privilege
Therefore we conclude that neither
article I, section 12 nor rule 502(a) gives the accused
spouse the right to invoke the marital testimonial
privilege
[19] We now turn to Robertson's argument that the
marital communication privileges contained in rule
502(b) and section 78-24-8(1) give him the nght to
prevent Cassie's testimony
Unlike marital
testimonial privileges, mantal communication
privileges may be asserted by either spouse, even
following the dissolution of the marriage
The
rationale
underlying
marital
communication
privileges is that such privileges "secur[e] an
expectation of privacy pertaining to confidential
communications between spouses " Utah R Evid
502 advisory committee note
In addition, by
securing this expectation of privacy, "marital
communication pnvilegefs]
*1229 encourage
mantal confidences, which in turn promote mantal
harmony" Id
[20] We begin with rule 502(b) That rule provides
(2) An individual has a pnvilege dumu the
^ person's life to refuse to testify or to prevent his
or her spouse or former spouse from testifying as
to any confidential communication made by the
individual to the spouse during their mainage and
to prevent another from disclosing any such
confidential communications
(4) No pnvilege exists under subparagraph (b) of
this rule
(B) As to any communication which was made, in
whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone
(I) to commit,
(n) to plan to commit, or
(in) to conceal a crime or a tort[ ]
Utah R Evid 502
Robertson argues that Cassie
should have been prohibited from testifying to
statements made by him to her during their mamage
However, rule 502(b)(4)(B) denies the pnvilege for
communications made to commit, to plan to commit,
or to conceal a crime
In this case, any
communication to which Cassie testified was made in
the course of a plan to commit or the commission of a
cnme
Robertson also relies on section 78-24-8(1) of the
Code Section 78-24- 8(1), which predates the
promulgation of rule 502 by this court, provides
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(a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either
during the marriage or afterwards be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the other dunng
the marriage
(b) This exception does not apply
(I) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse
against the other, (u) to a criminal action or
proceeding for a crime committed by one spouse
against the other,
(in) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to
support a spouse or child,
(IV) to any civil or criminal proceeding for abuse
or neglect committed against the child of either
spouse or
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law
Utah Code Ann § 78-24-8 (emphasis added)
Robertson argues that this section lacks the
exemption for a crime against a third person that is
included in rule 502(b), thus giving him the nght to
prevent Cassie from testifying
We reject this
argument
[21] Section 78-24-8(1) does not give Robertson the
nght to prevent Cassie from testifying because rule
502(b)'s exception for communications made in the
course of a plan to commit or the commission of a
crime falls within the statute's "otherwise specifically
provided by law" exception Rule 502(b) provides
that the marital communications privilege does not
apply where, as in this case, the communication is
made in the course of a plan to commit or the
commission of a crime
Thus, the "if otherwise
specifically provided by law" portion of section
78-24-8(1 )(b)(v) comes into play Rule 502(b) is a
"law" withm the meaning of section 78-24-8(1) See
Utah Const art VIII, § 4 ("The Supreme Court shall
adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in
the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the
appellate process The Legislature may amend the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all
members of both houses of the Legislature "), Utah
Code Ann § 78-2-4 (same), see also State v Benson
712 P2d 256, 258 (Utah 1985) (stating that "the
privileges provided for in section 78-24-8(1) have
been modified by [the predecessor rule to rule 502]")
Moreover, rule 501 states, "Except as provided in the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of
Utah, no person shall have a privilege to withhold
evidence except as provided by these or other rules
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court or by existing
statutory provisions not in conflict with them " Utah
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R Evid 501 (emphasis added) The advisory
committee note to rule 501 adds that 'all preexisting
statutory privileges' are accepted 'except those
inconsistent with these rules ' Id advisory committee
note
The note specifically *1230 indicates that
'Utah Code Ann § 78-24-8, insofar as it defines
privileges relating to spouses attorneys, clergy and
physicians [is] made ineffectual by the adoption of
rules specifically redefining those privileges ' Id
There is no doubt that rules of evidence and
procedure promulgated by this court under its
constitutional power operate to supersede inconsistent
statutory provisions State v Banner 717 P 2d 1325
1333 (Utah 1986), see also In re Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to be Used in the Courts of this State
18 Utah Adv Rep 3 (Sept 10, 1985) (per curiam)
(adopting 'all existing statutory rules of procedure
and evidence not inconsistent with or superseded by
rules of procedure and evidence heretofore adopted
by this Court") Therefore, Robertson is not entitled
to prevent Cassie from testifying because section
78-24-8(1) is inapplicable here by virtue of its "unless
otherwise specifically provided by law" exception
We conclude that because Cassie was not compelled
to t testify against Robertson and because any
cohimunications made to her by Robertson were in
furtherance of a crime, neither article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, rule 502 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, nor section 78-24-8(1) of the Code
prohibits Cassie from testifying in this case
Robertson's next claim of error relates to the trial
court's failure to grant his motion for a mistrial
following certain allegedly improper statements made
in the presence of the jury These statements arose
out of the following sequence of events First, the
prosecutor asked Cassie why it was important that she
explam the victim's murder to the jury
Cassie
responded "Because I did not act alone in this I
did not act alone And he knew, just like you knew,
and his attorney, everybody knew what would happen
should he act crazy" Robertson's attorney then
objected, moved to strike, and asked to approach the
bench With the jury present in the courtroom, the
court held a bench conference off the record and the
prosecutor privately admonished Cassie not to refer
to Robertson's history relating to mental illness
Robertson's attorney then requested that the
conversation be held someplace else, and the court
excused the jury
After the jury exited the
courtroom, Robertson's attorney reiterated her
objection to Cassie's response and also objected to
the prosecutor's admonition of Cassie Robertson's
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attorney alleged that in admonishing Cassie, the
prosecutor stated, "These proceedings have been
sanitized" so loudly that one of the jurors may have
overheard the statement Concerned that the jury
would infer from these comments that Robertson had
feigned mental illness to avoid prosecution,
Robertson's attorney moved for a mistrial
In responding to ihe motion, the trial court first
rejected Robertson's claim that any juror possibly
overheard the prosecutor's admonishment The judge
noted that he was sitting closer to the witness box
than the closest juror and he could not hear the
prosecutor's admonition Second, the court sustained
Robertson's objection to Cassie's comment and
ordered the comment stricken, but the court denied
the motion for mistrial
The court stated that the
reference to the word "crazy" or "craziness" at that
point m the trial had no meaning whatsoever to the
jury Furthermore, the court noted that the way it
occurred and the way it came in was such that the jury
would not remember what Cassie said
The court
denied the motion for mistrial on the basis of its
foregoing observations. Following its denial of the
motion, the court instructed the jury to disregard
Cassie's statement.
On appeal, Robertson argues that these "improper"
statements deprived him of the right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. We
reject this argument
[22][23][24] We will not reverse a trial court's denial
of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion.
State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992) At
trial, the court must determine whether an "incident
may have or probably influenced the jury, to the
prejudice of [the defendant]." Burton v Zions Coop
Mercantile Inst, 122 Utah 360, 249 P2d 514, 517
(1952).
If in exercising its discretion, the court
concludes that the incident probably did not prejudice
the jury, as the court did here, the court should deny
the *1231 motion. Id. "Once the trial court has
exercised [its] discretion and made [its] judgment
thereon, the prerogative of this court on review is
much more limited" Id Unless a review of the
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong
in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that
the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial,
we will not find that the court's decision was an abuse
of discretion. Id Wre review such a decision with just
deference because of the advantaged position of the
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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trial judge to determine the impact of events
occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings,
and this is especially so when what actually occurred
is m dispute
Cf State v Pena 869 P 2d 932,
935-36 (Utah 1994)
[25] Robertson has failed to show the requisite abuse
of discretion
The trial court determined that the
possible prejudicial impact of Cassie's ambiguous
statement was lost in the midst of the proceedings
But even so, he ordered Cassie's statement stricken
and instructed the jury to disregard it As for the
prosecutor's comment, the court determined that it
had not been heard by the jury From the record, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Robertson's motion for a
mistrial
We next address Robertson's claim that the trial court
committed reversible error when it refused to give
either of his requested supplemental reasonable doubt
instructions, both of which included an instruction on
the theory of reasonable alternative hypothesis
[26][27][28][29][30] A trial court has a duty to
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of
the case. State v Potter, 627 P2d 75, 78 (Utah
1981). A defendant also has the nght to have his or
her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear
and comprehensible manner. State v Smith, 706 P 2d
1052, 1058 (Utah 1985). "Whether the trial court's
refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes
error is a question of law, which we may review for
correctness." State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 238
(Utah 1992) (citations omitted). However, "[i]t is
not error to refuse a proposed instruction if the point
is properly covered in the other instructions " State v
Sessions, 645 P 2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (citations
omitted).
We review jury instructions in their
entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as
a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the case.
Robertson submitted to the court the following two
proposed instructions:
Instruction # 6
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon
the State to prove Mr. Jerry Lee Robertson guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. By reasonable doubt
is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
Ong. U S Govt Works
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understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or
the lack of evidence in this case
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all of the evidence in the case, you
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of Mr.
Robertson's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt.
But if after such an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence you can truthfully
say that you have an abiding conviction of Mr
Robertson's guilt, such as you would be willing to
act upon in the more weighty and important
matters relating to your own affairs, you have no
reasonable doubt A reasonable doubt must be a
real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary
To warrant you in convicting Mr Robertson, the
evidence must to your minds exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt
of Mr Robertson. That is to say, if after an
entire consideration and comparison of all of the
testimony in the case you can reasonably explain
the facts given m evidence on any reasonable
grounds other than the guilt of the defendant, you
should acquit him.
*1232 Instruction # 7
I have said that the burden of proof that the State
has is to prove that Jerry Lee Robertson is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond all conceivable doubt. No event in human
affairs has so absolutely certain a cause that one
could not, through elaborate exercise of
imagination, conceive of some other remotely
possible explanation for what happened.
In
saying that the State must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, what I mean is that you as
jurors must all be satisfied that no other
conceivable alternative explanation has any
reasonable likelihood. If you conclude, based on
the evidence in this case, or reasonable inferences
therefrom, that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the events charged against the Defendant can
be explamed on some basis inconsistent with
guilt, then the State has not sustained its burden
of proof. In essence, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof so convincing that a reasonable
person would not hesitate to rely on it and act on
it in the most important of his or her own affairs.
The court declmed to give either instruction.
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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Instead, it gave the jury the following instruction
Instruction # 15
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt In case of a
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, the defendant is entitled to a
not guilty verdict.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon
the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt
that is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all the evidence It must
be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly
speculative possibility
Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which
satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and obviates all
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt
. which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or
the lack of the evidence in this case.
The instruction the trial court actually gave is the
same instruction the court of appeals approved in
State v
Ontiveros, 835 P 2d 201, 206
(Utah.Ct.App 1992), State v Maestas, 815 P2d
1319, 1324 (Utah.Ct.App.1991), cert denied, 826
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), and State v Pedersen, 802
P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah.Ct.App. 1990), cert denied,
815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991). We conclude that the
instruction given to the jury in this case was an
appropriate statement of Utah law.
[31] In State v Johnson, 114 P 2d 1141, 1147-49
(Utah 1989), a majority of this court essentially
adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart's dissent in
State v Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989)
, for reviewing the appropriateness of a reasonable
doubt instruction. This analysis requires a three-part
test. First, "the instruction should specifically state
that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable
doubt." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J,
dissenting). Second, the instruction should not state
that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern
or control a person in the more weighty affairs of
life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the
decision of whether to convict. Id (Stewart, J,
Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

9*2 P 2d 1219
(Cite as: 932 P.2d 1219, *1232)
dissenting) Third, it is inappropriate to instruct that
a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility,'
although it is permissible to instruct that a 'fanciful or
wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat
proof beyond a reasonable doubt" Id at 1382
(Stewart, J, dissenting)
[32] Here the instruction met all three tests
It
contained a clear and unambiguous statement that the
State s proof must obviate all reasonable doubt, did
not define reasonable doubt in terms of the "more
weighty decisions in life," and articulated an
appropnate definition of "reasonable doubt" Though
the instruction did not specifically negate the *1233
"weighty decisions of life" analogy, nothing in
Johnson or Ireland suggests that the instruction must
do so [FN6]
We hold that this definition of
reasonable doubt did not trivialize or diminish the
required burden-of-proof standard
FN6 Interestingly, both of Robertson's
proposed
instructions contained the
impermissible analogy to the "weighty
decisions of life ' Robertsons first proposed
instruction stated in relevant part, '[l]f after
an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence you can
truthfully say that you have an abiding
conviction of Mr Robertson's guilt, such as
you would be willing to act upon in the
more weighty and important matters
relating to your own affairs, you have no
reasonable doubt" (emphasis added)
Robertson's other instruction stated in
relevant part, '[P]roof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof so convincing that a
reasonable person would not hesitate to rely
on it and act on it in the most important of
his or her own affairs " (emphasis added)
Thus, the court would have erred if it had
used either of Robertson's proposed
instructions
It is true that the court's instruction did not include a
generalized reference to a reasonable alternative
hypothesis, as did the proposed instructions
However, we have clearly held that no such
reasonable alternative need be mentioned where, as
here, the jury is instructed that the State must prove a
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt State v
Hansen 710 P 2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citmg State
v McClain 706 P 2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985), State v
Burton 642 P 2d ^16, 719 (Utah 1982)) Therefore,
we hold that the trial court did not err m refusing to
use Robertson's proposed jury instructions
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We now consider Robertsons final claim, which is
that the trial court erred by imposing restitution of
costs incurred to extradite Robertson and to house
Robertson at the State Hospital during his period ot
malingering
Robertson does not dispute the trial
court's authority to order restitution of extradition
costs under section 76-3-20 l(4)(b) [FN7] and costs
incurred by the State Hospital during his penod of
malingering under section 77-15- 9(4)
[FN8]
Instead, Robertson argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing restitution of costs without
considering his financial history and impecunious
status as required under sections 76-3-20 l(4)(c) and
77-32a-3oftheCode
FN7 Section 76-3-201(4)(b)(i) provides
When a defendant has been extradited to
this state under Title 77, Chapter 30
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal
charges and is convicted of criminal activity
in the county to which he has been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, order that the
defendant make restitution for costs
expended by any governmental entity for the
extradition
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-201 (4)(b)(i)
FN8 This section provides in part, 'If the
defendant requested the examination and is
found to be competent by the court the
department may recover the expenses of the
examination from the defendant ' Utah
Code Ann §77-15-9(4)
[33] "In a criminal action the court may require a
convicted defendant to make restitution and pay
costs" Utah Code Ann § 77-32a-l
Furthermore,
section 76-3-20 l(4)(b)(i) states that "the court may,
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order
that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition " Id §
76-3-20l(4)(b)(i)
The language of both sections is
permissive, therefore, the imposition of restitution is
a matter left to the discretion of the court State v
Snyder 747 P 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987)
However,
before ordering restitution, the court must take into
account the financial resources of the defendant
[FN9] Utah Code *1234 Ann §§ 76-3-201(4)(c)(i),
77-32a-3
Moreover, when the court determines
whether restitution of extradition costs is appropnate,
"the court shall make the reasons for the decision a
part of the court record " Id § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)
FN9 Actually, there are several factors that
the court is directed to take into account
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Section 76-3-20 l(4)(c) instructs the trial
court to take the following into account
(0 the financial resources of the defendant
and the burden that payment of the
restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant,
(n) the ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court,
(in) the rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and
the method of payment, and
(iv) other circumstances which the court
determines make restitution inappropriate
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-20 l(4)(c) Section
77-32a-3 provides
The court shall not include in the judgment
a sentence that a defendant pay costs unless
the defendant is or will be able to pay them
In determining the amount and method of
payment of costs, the court shall take
account of the financial resources of the
defendant and the nature of the burden that
payment of costs will impose and that
restitution be the first priority
Id § 77-32a-3

76-3-20l(4)(c)(i) contains almost identical language,
section 76- 3-201(4)(d)(i) adds, "If the court
determines that restitution is appropriate or
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall
make the reasons for the decision a part of the court
record"
Utah Code Ann § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i)
(emphasis added) We read this requirement to mean
that after taking into account the factors listed m
section 77-3-20 l(4)(c), the trial court must take the
additional step of explicitly noting on the record the
reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the
detailed factors listed in the statute
This directive
precludes the use of the Ramirez assumption

Although the trial judge did not specifically state that
he considered Robertson's financial condition in
ordering restitution, as a general rule, "this court
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make
findings on the record whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made
such findings." Ramirez, 817 P 2d at 788 n. 6 (Utah
1991)
As we discussed above, there are limited
instances in which this assumption should not be
made
when an ambiguity of the facts makes the
assumption unreasonable, id at 788, if the statute
explicitly provides that written findings must be
made, Labrum, 925 P 2d at 939-40, or when a prior
case states that findings on a particular issue must be
made to impress upon the trial court the importance
of the issue so as to ensure that we can properly
perform our appellate review function, see Nelson,
725 P 2d at 1356 n. 3. Though the imposition of
restitution of the State Hospital's costs does not fit
either exception to making the Ramirez assumption,
imposing restitution of extradition costs falls under
the Labrum exception.

[3£] We now address the question of whether it
would be reasonable to assume that the trial court
found that defendant had the ability to pay the
restitution of costs incurred by the State Hospital
Prior to the imposition of restitution costs at the
sentencmg hearing, the trial court considered the
information set forth in the presentence report. The
transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that this
report contained information concerning Robertson's
education and job history Robertson did not make
the presentence report part of the record and points to
no inaccuracy m the report. Aside from whatever
information
concerning
Robertson's
financial
resources may be in the presentence report, other
evidence in the record reveals that Robertson may
have the ability to pay the restitution imposed by the
court.
For example, counsel for Robertson stated
that he had held a number of jobs prior to his
incarceration. Robertson was also employed at the
State Hospital coffee shop during his pretrial
incarceration.

As noted above, Robertson is correct in asserting that
both sections 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i) and 77-32a-3 require
the court to consider his financial status before
ordenng restitution.
Section 77-32a-3 merely
requires the court to "take account of the financial
resources of the defendant."
While section
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

[34] In the present case, though the court explained
its reasons for imposing restitution of State Hospital
costs incurred during Robertson's penod of
malingering, the court did not discuss on the record
the reasons for ordering restitution of extradition
costs Because this error occurred at the sentencing
stage, where costs were imposed, we vacate the
portion of the order imposing extradition costs and
remand to the trial court for further proceedmgs in
compliance with section 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)

The trial court's actions at the sentencmg hearing
mdicate that it considered Robertson's financial
resources. The court separated the costs owed to the
State Hospital and emphasized that the restitution
amount was conservative
Significantly, the court
used its discretion not to impose additional restitution
for other trial costs and further declined to impose
Ong. U S. Govt. Works
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any fine
This indicates that the court used some
factor to limit the amount of restitution costs imposed
on defendant Because the court had already ordered
defendant to pay a significant sum as restitution, this
limiting factor was likely defendant's *1235 ability to
pay
Although the court did not make findings
relating to Robertson's financial condition part of the
record, we can reasonably assume that the court
actually made such findings We hold that because
the trial court can properly be assumed to have
considered Robertson's financial status, it did not err
in imposing restitution of the State Hospital costs
We affirm the jury's verdict and the trial court's
sentence ordering restitution of costs incurred by the
State Hospital
We vacate the trial court's order
imposing restitution of extradition costs and remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
compliance with section 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i)
Justice HOWE and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief
Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
I dissent.
I submit that the majority opinion
implicitly assumes that a finding of malingering
equals a finding of competence. It is possible for a
person to be malingering and incompetent at the same
time.
The trial court addressed the question of
malmgenng, but it did not address the question of
defendant's competence to stand trial, even though a
petition alleging incompetence was duly filed.
Because the trial court failed to rule on defendant's
allegations of incompetency as required by statute, I
would remand for the statutorily mandated treatment
of defendant's petition, especially in light of the trial
court's initial finding of incompetency.
7

On the basis of the testimony of two psychologists,
the court initially found defendant incompetent to
stand trial and committed him to the state hospital.
Upon receiving reports of possible malmgenng, the
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on that
question. The court ruled that defendant had been
malmgenng, vacated its ongmal finding of
incompetency and order of commitment, and entered
findmgs of fact and conclusions of law. Although
some of the testimony presented at the hearing
consisted of opinions about defendant's competency,
the court's findings and conclusions related solely to
the issue of malmgenng
At that point, the court
stated that the issue of competency was at
"equipoise," as if "the Findmg and Order [which had
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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held defendant was incompetent to stand trial] had
never been forthcoming " The court also noted that
defendant had the right to petition again for a
determination of competency, which defendant did on
March 3, 1994
Yet the trial court has never entered an order on the
legal question of defendant's allegations of
incompetency, as required by Utah Code Ann § 7715-5(1). That provision, at the tune Robertson filed
his second petition, stated in pertinent part [FN 1 ]
FN1 This provision was substantiallv
amended effective May 2, 1994, and now
requires a preliminary ruling on the
sufficiency of the allegations, followed by a
full hearing if the court finds 'that the
allegations of incompetency raise a bona
fide doubt as to the defendant's competency
to stand trial"
When a petition is filed pursuant to Section
77-15-3 the court shall enter an order for a
heanng on the mental condition of the person
who is the subject of the petition
Tie tnal court in this case has not complied with this
statutory requirement.
The majority apparently
presumes that a competency ruling is merely a factual
findmg that is subject to the analysis presented in
State v Ramirez, 817 P 2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991)
That is not correct. At the time Robertson filed his
petition, section 77-15-5(1) required, and still
requires, the court to make a specific legal
determination about defendant's competency Under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, a person is incompetent
to stand tnal if he is unable "to have a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings against him
or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged" or he is unable to "consult with counsel and
to participate in the proceedmgs agamst him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding " When
Robertson filed his petition, the tnal court was
required to hold an evidentiary heanng on the matter
and rule on defendant's competency to stand tnal
The majonty apparently argues that we can simply
infer that factual findmgs on *1236 the competency
issue were made to support a legal ruling that was
never entered. Neither Ramirez nor any other case
supports such a proposition. Even if the court had
entered a legal ruling on the issue of competency, the
failure to make any factual findmgs renders this case
closely analogous to State v Labrum, 925 P 2d 937,
940-41 (Utah 1996), which held that failure to make
statutonly mandated findmgs may constitute
Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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reversible error
In short, I do not believe that trial courts can simply
dispense with the statutory requirements of §
77-15-5(1) and § 77-15-2, as the majority allows in
this case Although the court did state that it "does
not believe that the Defendant will cooperate in the
performance of a competency evaluation and that,
therefore, the evaluation will not render valid data,"
this statement was made pnor to the petition for
inquiry into defendant's competency, and it related
specifically to the court's opinion as to defendant's
malingering behavior It therefore could not suffice
as a ruling on defendant's allegations of
incompetency
The issues of malingering and
competency, though inevitably somewhat interrelated,
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are nevertheless legally and logically distinct and
cannot be conflated for purposes of competency
determinations
In the context of a fundamental decision which goes
to the heart of the authority and ability of the state to
try a defendant for crimes charged, I would hold that
trial courts must make their competency rulings,
along with detailed findings supporting those rulings,
on the record.
Justice DURHAM concurs in Associate Chief Justice
STEWART'S dissenting opinion
END OF DOCUMENT
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